Toespraak minister Koenders bij Johns Hopkins University bij ontvangst Woodrow Wilson Award

Toespraak | 29-04-2017

Koenders ontvangt de prijs voor zowel zijn huidige werk als minister van Buitenlandse Zaken als voor eerdere functies. Eerder werd de prijs al uitgereikt aan onder andere Zeid Raad Al-Hussein, de huidige VN Hoge Commissaris voor de Mensenrechten, en Madeleine Albright, de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van de VS ten tijde van president Bill Clinton.

Bij de uitreiking gaf de minister een toespraak gaf hij zijn visie op de ontwikkelingen op het gebied van internationale betrekkingen de afgelopen decennia. Lees hier de toespraak.

‘Europe’s Security Environment and the Transatlantic Relationship’

Good afternoon, fellow alumni. It’s great to see so many friends from long ago. I’m honoured to receive this Johns Hopkins ‘Woodrow Wilson Award for Distinguished Government Service’, an award given by the University to (and I quote) ‘those who have brought it credit by their current or recently concluded public service’.

As you may know, the government I presently serve as Minister of Foreign Affairs is now in caretaker mode, following our general election in March. So, my public service is indeed ‘current’, but it may very well soon become ‘recently concluded’.  It all depends on the negotiators.

I hope, in all humility and modesty, that I have indeed brought credit to this university. And the credit goes in fact, to the SAIS, and this great Bologna Center.

For me, this is a great opportunity to reflect on the last couple of years, decades even, of government service, and to share some insights with you – a distinguished crowd with whom I hope to have a more interactive exchange afterwards.

I must confess that standing here, in beautiful Bologna, it seems like only yesterday that I was here studying International Economics and European Studies – maybe because I’ve stayed in close contact with this unique school.

Yet in all fairness, it was decades ago; so much has happened since 1979. But one thing has never changed: my firm belief in international cooperation, and my drive to help make the world a better place for all. A drive that has become even stronger in the current political climate, where the differences between left and right seem to have been replaced by new, deeply polarising paradigms: between internal and external. Between national and international. Between the ‘My Country First’ -movements and those who believe we need to both defend, but also renew and innovate our structures of international cooperation, and our so-called liberal world order.

I think the foundation for my drive was laid way back during my childhood in post-war Arnhem: a city in ruins and one that, as a child and teenager, I witnessed being rebuilt by a traumatised but resilient people.

My childhood was filled with stories from that war. ’Never again’ was a natural motivation for my choice to study international relations. Subsequently, I was lucky enough to get the opportunity to pursue a career in that field. And throughout those years – whether I was working as an MP, for the EU and the United Nations, or as development minister and later foreign minister – I was grateful for the sound theoretical, practical and interdisciplinary foundation I was given here at Johns Hopkins – a continuing source of knowledge and inspiration. It was an opportunity to get to know myself and to respect and understand ‘the Other’.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Let me briefly focus on that particular year, when I began my studies here in Bologna.

In the study of international relations, we often speak of ‘pivotal years’.

And of course it’s tempting to assume that this year, which was so important to me personally, was of grand historical importance for the world at large. To believe that the year 1979 belongs in the ranks of all those other years with global significance: 1789, 1917, 1945, 1989….

But in fact it’s not hard to find indications – proof even – of the pivotal nature of 1979, my year here in Bologna.

You may be tempted to think: ‘1979? Has he (Mr Koenders) succumbed to the charms of fake news?’ But my proof comes in the form of a serious book I read recently. It’s by Christian Caryl, and it’s called 1979 and the Birth of the 21st Century.

See?

1979: who’d have guessed, right? But honestly, it’s an interesting, if somewhat sketchy book. It playfully connects the dots between five seemingly unrelated events that all took place that year. Five events that most people who lived through them recall as moments in the ‘I still remember where I was when...’ - category.

So here they are: the Iranian revolution, Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in China, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, John Paul the Second’s visit to Poland and Margaret Thatcher’s first general election victory.

These events all took place in 1979. And indeed, I remember exactly where I was when they happened: right here, in Bologna, during the class of ’79/’80!

But quite seriously, this book makes the case that these events marked the beginning of something bigger. That they were indicators of developments that still resonate today, well into the 21th century. That maybe 1979 was as important as 1989…

The Pope’s visit one could claim, heralded the peaceful end of communism and the end of the bipolar world. The revolution in Iran marked the beginning of a return of violence practised through religion and a new challenge to the West. Thatcher preached to the British people about all the things they could do if the state would only let them. At the same time, in China Deng was coming to the same conclusion by radically liberalising the economy. And lastly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan left us with a legacy that, in a way, we’re still struggling with today.

But let me not take up too much of your time by recounting a book you can read for yourselves. A book that’s mostly fun food for thought, and which I cite here rather playfully to underline a serious message I wish to convey: that my year at JHU was pivotal for me, and that I am, to this day, extremely grateful.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Here in Bologna, 1979 ushered in a period that would lead to 1980s strage di Bologna, when a neo-fascist organisation detonated a bomb at Central Station, killing 85 people and wounding many more. It was an enormous tragedy, and I still remember it vividly.

Italy itself had undergone fundamental political changes. The ‘Historic Compromise’ had been struck– thecompromesso storico – an alliance between the Christian Democrats and the Italian Communist Party. It was the start of a new Italian politics explained to us so expertly by Professor Gianfranco Pasqua.

For Europe and the European Union, it was a time of deepening cooperation and gradual expansion. After growing from its original six to nine member states in 1973 (including the UK, I should add), negotiations with Greece were under way, soon to be followed by talks with Spain and Portugal. Indeed, the dictatorial regimes of the ‘southern flank’ were developing into democracies. And this, I believe, is something to remember and be proud of when we talk about the EU.

But it was also a period of renewed economic turmoil – especially on our European continent. It was the end of what the French used to call ‘les Trente Glorieuses’. A time when the second oil crisis – influenced at least in part by the Iranian Revolution I mentioned earlier – sent interest rates skyrocketing and put European economies under heavy strain.

It was the time of NATO’s Double-Track Decision (whereby 572 mid-range missiles would be stationed in Europe to restore the threat of mutually assured destruction). A decision which led to mass protests in my own country and in Germany (and which eventually led to the political demise of Helmut Schmidt).

Finally, it was not only the first year of Thatcher in the UK, but also Carter’ last year before Reagan took over in the USA. The latter was a President who was met with a high degree of scepticism and even hostility in Europe. Later, his track record was later debated among scholars and politicians alike.

The years that followed – years in which I started my political career in the Netherlands – were dominated by German and European unification, a momentous and well-recorded time that boosted both the scope of EU cooperation and the enlargement of the Union – twin goals that did not always go hand in hand.

They were years in which the multilateral system continued to evolve, with the UN at its helm.

Years in which, especially after the peaceful collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, an era of optimism began. Multilateral disarmament treaties were concluded, and the EU and NATO welcomed new member states. Countries whose alliances had for too long been forced upon them could finally start making their own, sovereign choices. Yeltsin’s Russia, we hoped, would become a partner, integrated into our European value system.

Over time, we became a European Union of 28 member states (yes, I realise we will soon be back to 27). And after Montenegro’s accession to NATO next month the Atlantic Alliance will have the same number of members.

These were years that can be best be described, I believe, as a grand European ‘geopolitical vacation’, because Europe continued to benefit from US security guarantees, which allowed it to expand and deepen its market.

Simultaneous, in the nineties, we witnessed unprecedented economic growth, with opportunities for many.

But in the process, the neo-liberal system generated a growing category of people who got left behind.

Despite the macroeconomic success story, for too long people’s struggles at the micro level remained largely under the radar. Until academics like Dani Rodrik and others put the spotlight on them, on the squeezing of the middle class, on the underemployment of a whole new generation and on the debt-ridden economic model. He explained to us why so many voters were now looking to pull the emergency brake.

What’s more, the narrative of Western societies as ‘successful markets’ and ‘generators of opportunity’ turned out to be insufficient for many as a source of inspiration. In any case, it was insufficient as a replacement for the social role that for centuries had fallen to religion and the church – a role that was now shrinking in many European countries. It was, to put it melodramatically, as if our affluent societies were missing their heart and soul.

And this may well have been one of the key problems of our European Union. A project founded after the Second World War on the basis of a shared philosophy of ‘never again’ had indeed brought peace and stability for many.

But it had done so in a non-political, technocratic fashion. It was a factory of rules and regulations, where the sound of politics could often barely be heard over the machinery of bureaucracy.

I think we’ve reached a stage in Europe where it’s clear to us all that we need politics back at centre stage. A new politics. Because the legislative machine can’t offer the unifying narrative that’s so important for popular support. And without popular support we are going nowhere. If that post-war ‘never again’ is no longer a convincing narrative for the younger generation, then what do we have to replace it with? Quite frankly, as practical as it may be, ‘no more roaming charges’ is probably not going to be enough to stem the distrust of politics.

Ladies and gentlemen,

You may have noticed that we’ve gradually moved into the present.

I took office as foreign minister in October 2014. Before that I’d been development minister and UN Special Representative leading peacekeeping operations in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali. Those years showed me that the future of the transatlantic alliance – and of Europe itself – is deeply intertwined with the emancipated developing world which is now taking centre stage. And that will create enormous opportunities, economically and politically.

But it will also create vulnerabilities in our own societies, and the need for a fairer, more inclusive international system. More and more we have the choice between importing instability or exporting stability. And for Europe that has to mean the end of the geopolitical vacation I spoke of.

Even in the three short years that I’ve served as foreign minister, so much has changed – things that few of us (even academics) expected and would have been described as a perfect storm. Unlikely to happen in this form and combination.

In 2014 Russia challenged us with a new, assertive stance – the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. The situation in Syria developed from a national uprising into a complex regional conflict and eventually, with the involvement of Russia and Iran, into a global web.

It became an unending nightmare for the Syrian people, who were even faced with the horror of chemical weapons. In 2014, an Islamic State was proclaimed from Baghdad. With the help of a 70-nation coalition, this barbarous organisation has been driven back in the intervening years, but is not defeated yet. And finally, international terrorism claimed victims in cities close to home, like Brussels, Paris, Nice, Berlin and Stockholm.

What I’d like to do next is highlight some trends that I believe we will have to live with for years to come, and perhaps generations. Trends that give rise to questions like: are we at a turning point today? Is the unexpected, the unimaginable the new normal? And if so, how do we make sure we act wisely?

A turning point: that may sound ominous, especially at a time when, economically, things are finally moving in a more positive direction. After the 2007 economic crisis, our economies are picking up again. European nations are still world leaders in many respects: innovation, competitiveness, social security, internet density, social engagement, pension systems and press freedom.

But we are also undergoing a number of systemic crises. Some with national and some with geopolitical consequences. The euro crisis, a rapidly aging population, the discussion about flexibility in our labour markets and the challenge of robotization for all of us, and the difficult integration of newcomers.Politics, too, is changing fundamentally. Resistance to political and economic elites is growing. Undercurrents are coming to the surface and taking a place on the democratic stage. We’ve seen this in the US, in the Netherlands, in France, and in Germany as well.

So let us look at several trends that I believe will unfold over the next few decades, and which may lead us to the conclusion that we are at a pivotal moment today. And don’t get me wrong. Pivotal moments don’t have to lead to disaster. They can also lead to positive outcomes, but only if we handle them with wisdom and care.

1.   Disintegrative forces

Since the Second World War, we‘ve witnessed a gradual process of international integration. The UN, the WTO, the EU, NATO: the international community has worked hard in recent decades to manage its interdependence. It has set up supranational institutions and pooled its sovereignty, with the EU leading the way. Some even saw the EU as the saviour of the nation-state. And in NATO it has established a strong system of collective security. The Netherlands was often at the forefront in this process, as was Italy.

With the slaughter of the First and Second World Wars still fresh in their minds, people understood this need for integration. Europe had been to the brink of Armageddon. And, as I’ve said, the new rallying cry was ‘Never again!’ A system of constructively interwoven interests and pooled strengths would put that credo into practice. Post-war reconstruction went hand in hand with the creation of the welfare state and a social and political compromise sustained by checks and balances.

National sovereignty and globalisation, you could say, still both reinforced and restrained each other.

But today, this integration project is no longer accepted without question. On the contrary, disintegrative forces are gaining strength. The newspaper Le Monde has referred to this process as ‘Le fantasme de la démondialisation’ and I believe that this year, 2017, in Europe but also beyond, our greatest challenge will be to fight this ‘fantasme’.

That is easier said than done. The benefits of interdependence are often not tangible enough and are sometimes at odds with the public’s loyalty. People feel the need to ‘take back control’ – not only in Britain, but also in France, Germany and elsewhere.

They feel interdependence is not their project, but that of a ‘cosmopolitan elite’. And it must be said: the fruits aren’t shared fairly, and never have been, as so many economists have convincingly, if belatedly, argued.

The response is plain for all to see: Brexit, Trump, Le Pen, the AfD. Sovereigntist parties are doing well all across Western Europe – including the Netherlands. The 2005 Dutch referendum on the EU constitutional treaty was the first sign.

Then, last April, the Association Agreement with Ukraine was rejected by a new referendum. Our recent general election didn’t result in victory for the Eurosceptic forces, but they will remain a significant factor.

So we need to come up with good answers. Better answers than Brexit or ‘America first’. Answers to those who, when I was on the campaign trail, made clear that for them the world is changing too quickly, their control is slipping away and their very identity is at stake. And for what? What has globalisation ever done for them? Did anyone ever ask them what they wanted? In this new world are our nation states nothing more than helpless provinces?

Inequality between nations have been reduced, but within our countries increased. We have to recognise that globalisation has benefited many but definitely not all – especially in socioeconomic terms. The Netherlands, including the current government, has managed to address this. Thankfully we still have a working social contract. Because without one, economies will turn inward and become protectionist, with all political consequences that entails. In my country, too, it is not so much the phenomenon of migration that is eroding the idea of cultural identity, but rather its pace, direction and management. Some are asking: ‘Do we have to give up our essence for an “elitist project” that has no apparent benefit for us?’ We have to address those fears – I believe we still have a chance to do so, but it may be our last.

I believe we will need a much better managed process of globalisation. A return to some form of embedded liberalism, which underlines the need to reduce the enormous inequalities – economic and cultural – within our societies. Only a new social and democratic contract can put a halt to xenophobia and populism, and ensure the political basis for international cooperation.

The second trend I would like to discuss is, with a question mark:

2.   Is the Anglo-American world disengaging from Europe?

Europe, which is set to decline as an economic power in the decades ahead. Five years ago, the EU member states accounted for 20% of the world economy. Forty years ago the figure was 45%. In five years’ time, it will be just 15%, and that’s without allowing for the impact of Brexit.

Enormous changes are under way, especially in the East. Of the world’s seven billion people, four billion live in Asia. The shift towards China and Asia is essential for us too, and a logical correct to the transatlantic past.

As a consequence, the US’s interest in Europe will decline. I have no illusions about that. The US will continue to insist that Europe take responsibility for its own security. President Trump is saying it loud and clear, but in fact all US policymakers, including the Democrats, have taken the same view. And, I would add, they’re not entirely wrong. Why should the US be covering such a large part of Europe’s security needs in today’s world?

Sharing the burden and sharing control go hand in hand, and are in all our interests. They are also in the interests of fostering mutual engagement, rather than disengagement.

Of course, sharing the burden is about much more than just hard security. It’s about our investment in international public goods, such as food and energy security, clean water and clean air, and care for the climate – a burden we should share much more fairly. There are many free riders in this area, too. And they will eventually erode the system, putting the Sustainable Development Goals out of reach and jeopardising all of our security. Human security, ladies and gentlemen, is not a left or a right wing issue; it’s a basic need, across the entire political spectrum.

But there’s more to the risk of Anglo-American disengagement from Europe. Let’s face it: Brexit will further reduce Europe’s strategic importance. When the UK leaves, the EU will take a big hit: 30% of its fleet, 20% of its trading capacity, 30% of its expeditionary military capability, 16% of its GNP, and 20% of its official development assistance will walk out the door.

To be sure, Brexit won’t necessarily mean British disengagement. But we can’t rule it out. One thing is certain: a new ‘splendid isolation’ – withdrawal from Europe – is not in our interests, and certainly not now. Europe has always been weaker when the Anglo-American powers have withdrawn, such as in 1919, when the US Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. So we must keep the Americans and the British engaged, above all through the transatlantic alliance.

But what is more, now that the UK is set to leave us we must help Germany accept its leadership role in Europe. Through its history and location, Germany is also a bridge to Central Europe. Germany is taking more and more responsibility for security policy. It has been active in Afghanistan, of course, since 2001. And it has returned to peacekeeping, playing a major role in Mali, partly at the request of the Netherlands and France. Germany is daring to act ‘out of area’ again – although this understandably remains a politically sensitive issue in Germany.

Despite their differences, France, Germany, the UK and North America, together with other founding EU nations like Italy and the Netherlands, are members of the same community of values. They stand for international law, freedom, democracy and the rule of law. It’s important to reflect on this at a time when those freedoms seem to be under increasing pressure in an uncertain, insecure world, where authoritarian leadership is on the rise – even within Europe.

3.   Growing uncertainty and hybrid threats

Ladies and gentlemen,

Less than 30 years ago, the greatest threat that kept us awake at night was serious but manageable: a large-scale conventional Russian tank invasion through the Fulda Gap – the low-lying route between East and West Germany. Napoleon had taken it after his defeat in Leipzig. American troops had followed it in their advance eastwards in April 1945.

Would the Fulda Gap reaffirm its historical significance during the Cold War?

The prospect was terrifying – fear of a nuclear Armageddon was never far away, as I remember personally. But it was also easily comprehensible. NATO had prepared for this scenario. Geography and state action were still the main determinants.

Today, this is no longer the case. Today a huge game of chess is being played simultaneously on many boards. The pieces are not only states but also non-state actors. And, increasingly, the game is also being played in a whole other dimension: cyberspace.

This complex, manifold, ever-changing threat has a name – a hybrid threat. It demands a sophisticated response. Everything about this threat is in flux, even the dividing line between ‘war’ and ‘peace’. The opponent hides in the shadows and acts asymmetrically. Its armoury includes spurious humanitarian aid, NGO financing, minority and language politics, radio propaganda, Facebook and Twitter sock puppets. It delivers smartly packaged misinformation directly to the public. It spreads malware and causes confusion. And digitally savvy Europe is very vulnerable to this type of manipulation and cyber threat.

What’s more, it isn’t always clear whose move it is. We’ve seen non-state actors grow up very quickly in recent years: just look at ISIS. Groups that totally reject the Westphalian system of states. And not only the system, but everything else we believe in.

In this sense, ISIS defies description. The apocalyptic movement rapidly conquered an area half the size of France using a devious combination of medieval methods – terrifying violence and religious inspiration – together with conventional and highly modern hybrid warfare.

The coalition has recently regained the upper hand, but we must be realistic: we are still a long way from slaying this many-headed monster. Ultimately, how we deal with this challenge will be determined by the resilience, and by the democratic, more and security responses, of our societies.

4.   Instability on the southern border

We must recognise that Europe’s southern border has become the main exporter of instability to our region.The fundamental causes lie in deep political and socioeconomic crises in a region that has been badly served by failing states and failing systems. But we must be honest: those failing states and systems have themselves been caused, aggravated and badly served by the West itself. Take the invasion of Iraq in 2003, for example. Or the amateurish intervention in Libya in 2011.

These states are no longer capable of providing basic public services and their new leaders often lack legitimacy.

The socioeconomic tensions in these countries are at breaking point. While the West is struggling with an ageing population, they have an enormous ‘youth bulge’. There’s a whole generation that’s reasonably well-educated but has no prospect of finding work. This is fuelling enormous discontent, mass migration from the countryside to urban areas, and shortages of basic facilities such as housing and water.

But there’s more to it than that. There are deep ideological divisions in the region, too. Divisions between Shiites and Sunnis. Divisions involving the unresolved Palestinian question. Divisions that increase tribalism in many Arab and African countries, hampering the development of modern state institutions. Divisions that exacerbate the anti-American, anti-Western feelings that are rapidly gaining ground.

This could lead to an explosive mix: a young population that is receptive to radicalisation and fed by a criminal undercurrent.

Europe will have to do more to fulfil its political responsibility to influence these events, by using an intelligent mix of fair trade, investment and political engagement. Otherwise, it will only import the instability that is plaguing these regions.

And that was my main message when I met with my EU counterparts yesterday in Malta (Gymnich meeting). Europe has to be reformed, simplified, and must be made more willing to shoulder its responsibilities.

5.   The re-awakening of old empires

While parts of our southern border are imploding, other neighbours are flexing their muscles. Russia, Turkey and Iran are breathing new life into age-old imperial traditions, displaying a new self-assuredness founded on their deeply-rooted and historically-anchored national histories.

Thus, rather than embracing the global integration of economies and values that seemed to start after 1989, Russia is reverting to core values reminiscent of Catherine the Great, who, by the way, also annexed Crimea.

In recent years Russia has taunted us with its involvement in Ukraine, its illegal annexation of Crimea, its criminal military involvement in Syria, its placement of Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, and its snap military exercises, cyberattacks and hybrid threats.

Russia seems to be becoming less a partner and more a strategic opponent. This huge risk must be avoided at all costs. Russia is a country with which we share many interests, such as energy security and the fight against terrorism. It’s a country we need, and a country that needs us. And that means Europe needs to pursue a varied but complex policy of carrots and sticks.

The same is true to some extent of NATO ally Turkey. It, too, represents a complex geopolitical reality. Turkey is a key link in the geopolitical chain and a country whose record on human rights and press freedom is a cause for grave concern. Concern that has certainly not diminished since the referendum of April 16th.

And finally there is Iran, a country we now have closer ties with. It’s an important regional player that has to be reckoned with – in Syria, in Lebanon and in Iraq. It’s the leader of the Shiite branch of Islam in the Middle East, and not always a force for good. It also has a strong cyber capability. I think the nuclear deal with Iran was a textbook example of how to conduct international diplomacy, but one that will succeed only with strict verification. After all, we mustn’t be naïve about this either.

6.   Foreign affairs are domestic affairs

The next trend I’d like to discuss brings us closer to home. Safely behind the dikes and the dunes, as we used to say in the Netherlands. A place where we once felt shielded from events in the big wide world outside – but not anymore.

The influence of foreign factors on our domestic affairs has mushroomed in recent years. This has enriched us. Never before have so many Dutch people enjoyed foreign holidays, benefited from Erasmus grants, watched international television, made cheap phone calls to relatives abroad, seized trade and investment opportunities, or benefited from the diversity of products and services that have become available in the Netherlands.

The ‘cross-border’ world has become a given, and many are enjoying the fruits. The process has been boosted by the democratisation of information via the worldwide web, the emergence of the middle class in developing countries, access to credit, the spectacular drop in the price of airfares, the rapid spread of cheap mobile phones and 3G networks, the convenience of global banking, the internationalisation of education, social media and 24-hour news.

But this interconnectedness also has a less pleasant side. Conflicts are being imported into Europe, into our cities. Social and religious institutions in the Netherlands are receiving foreign funding, while their beliefs are completely alien to the core values of our democracy and the rule of law. Unrest and sociopolitical conflicts in other countries are being imported too.

Take the Gülen movement versus the AKP, or the Kurds versus the Turks. The recent Turkish referendum caused turmoil in cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam, where many Dutch people of Turkish descent live. There is an interplay between foreign and domestic politics for all of us to see.

But the biggest impact of all, of course, has been made by the recent terrorist attacks. They happened so close to home – Paris, Brussels, Stockholm – and are still so fresh in our minds. They have severely shaken our sense of security, partly because they were committed not by ‘them’ but by ‘us’. That feels like fratricide, as President Hollande so eloquently put it, and what could be worse than that? Still, I don’t believe that international terrorism is an existential threat – though we must ensure we don’t allow it to become one.

And that brings me to the seventh and final trend.

7.   Pressure of migration

The direct consequence of everything I’ve just described is the recent influx of migrants into Europe. It originated in war-torn Syria, where people have fled the horrors of a violent war and seek asylum from a country where we all failed the responsibility to protect.

But let’s not fool ourselves. The demographic pressure from sub-Saharan Africa, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh is also a major factor.

The demographic explosion in these countries will be one of the biggest challenges of the 21st century. Half the world’s population growth in the next 40 years will be in Africa. Most of the migration is taking place in the region, as I have experienced in West Africa.

The democratisation of information has also suddenly made Europe seem very close. Its appeal is obvious. The failing states on the southern shores of the Mediterranean are no longer able to control the flow of migration and offer their people a future. In a country like Mali, foreign remittances account for 15% of GNP. That’s a far higher percentage than the development aid it receives.

So, for these countries, migration is not always a problem. Sometimes it solves a problem: it’s a welcome escape valve to let jobless young people leave the country. These factors won’t change any time soon. Migration pressure on Europe is here to stay – even if lasting peace is achieved in Syria. The best thing we can do is be prepared for it and take serious policy measures, as we are currently doing with the EU migration compacts, where countries of origin, transit and destination work together effectively, including our root causes like youth unemployment and the lack of sexual and reproductive rights of women. Because human trafficking, corruption and the many tragic drownings in the Mediterranean should be a moral and political appeal to us all.

Ladies and gentlemen,

I’ve just outlined seven key trends in our global environment that I believe will shape our policies in the future. I hope you’re still with me and you’ll permit me to draw a few conclusions.

What do these trends mean for us? For politicians, for specialists in international affairs, for policymakers? For our investment in the transatlantic relationship, for our new relations within Europe, for our relationship with the British after Brexit, and for Europe’s ties with the rest of the world? 

Let me offer some closing thoughts that we can elaborate on in the panel discussion.

First, on the future of multilateral solutions, including the UN. Second, on the transatlantic relationship and NATO. And third, on Europe.

(1)

The Netherlands is the world’s 17th-largest economy and it relies heavily on foreign trade. So we have always had an interest in a stable, rules-based world order. We often punched above our weight not only in the UN but also in NATO, the EU, and the OSCE. We do so because we understand it is in our vital interest. And I strongly believe that, given the changing paradigms in the global arena, the same is true of the bigger European member states, and even the United States.

Because the last thing we should want is a world collapsing into multiple power blocs, and challenges by revisionist powers, each applying their own sets of rules, without the shared universal basis we still enjoy today. 

That means we will have to strengthen and defend – but at the same time innovate and modernise – the way we work together at international level. The international order will not survive without a new framework for effectiveness and legitimacy.

That means we must continue to believe in the promise of our multilateral system, with the UN at its helm. For more than 70 years, it has protected our common, universal values and human rights. But we also know that its Security Council needs to be fundamentally reformed, as is now happening with the Bretton Woods Institutions. We have to redouble our efforts on the Sustainable Development Goals, and make serious work of the ‘Leave No One Behind’ agenda. These agendas for development and inclusiveness are also agendas for security. The must be strengthened, modernised and put into a 21st country operation. To do so will require new public-private partnerships, also around issues like the climate and inclusiveness.

(2)

That said, when it comes to transatlantic security, NATO will also remain relevant, both in terms of a renewed emphasis on article 5 and on ‘out of area’ missions. It will remain the cornerstone of our security. However, we need more balance in our relationship with the other side of the Atlantic. The United States is right when it calls on us, the European allies, to do more. Though we should also acknowledge that the European allies reversed the downward trend in defence spending some years ago.

But security is about more than simply NATO’s ‘hard security’. Europe has made a huge investment in ‘soft power’ in recent decades. Take the help it gave the former Warsaw Pact countries in their transition processes, offering them the prospect of entry into the European social market economy and the European community of values.

This is an approach which has worked successfully for some time, and – I’ll say it again – it represents a huge investment. I emphasise this point because it seems tempting lately to label European NATO partners ‘free riders’. That is not only too easy; it is factually inaccurate.    

Because security is about so much more than hard power. Diplomacy and development are an integral part of security – we must never forget that. And a large part of our soft power relies on trade and the economy. And that’s not insignificant when we look at the combined interests of Europe and the US in the world.  

Because, let’s be frank: together the US and the EU still represent 40% of global GDP, 50% of foreign direct investment and a third of global trade. So we must ensure we don’t simply put EU-US cooperation on hold along with TTIP.

But more importantly: we represent a community of values.

With a new American president we may have to get used to a NEW, more disruptive tone coming from Washington. But the transatlantic relationship is about so much more. It goes back centuries and covers all sections of society. We are still the same community of values we have always been. We should remember that ‘what divides us makes headlines; what unites us makes progress’.

We will stand shoulder to shoulder with the US, as we did after 9/11, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and in operations such as Resolute Support. As we have on ballistic missile defence, Baltic Air Policing, the Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltics, and interoperability.

But we will have to muster the same determination when it comes to the issues of the future. And there it gets a bit hazy. There seems to be a lack of conviction. A lack of urgency.

And that is dangerous. If we choose protectionism over fair trade; if we kill the Paris agreement rather than transforming our world economy to save the planet and start a real energy transition; if we don’t work jointly to develop standards to control the risks of international financial capital, then we could jeopardise our partnership.

So with regard to the transatlantic relationship and NATO I would like to say: let’s not simply dismiss what we’ve built. Instead, let’s acknowledge that there are problems, but also that they are smaller than we thought and shrinking all the time. And then let’s find ways to make things better. I hope we will be doing exactly that at the upcoming NATO summit – not to mention in the UN, in the OECD, in the World Bank, and everywhere else that our cooperation is vital.

(3)

Of course, we can only do that if we continue to believe in our own strength in Europe – including after Brexit. This means that Europe must be willing to take a long, hard look in the mirror. We must dare to reform the EU where needed. And to engage in more flexible forms of cooperation when appropriate. Why should a ‘multi-speed’ Europe be taboo when it already exists? Just look at Schengen and the euro. Yes, we need a different EU. But make no mistake: a ‘better’ Europe doesn’t automatically mean ‘more’ Europe. Nor does it mean less. I’m neither a federalist nor a Eurosceptic.

We need an EU that focuses on its core priorities, and acts with resolve in areas of clear added value. An EU that is big on the big things, and small on the small things. An EU that visibly delivers on issues that matter to people: jobs and growth, migration and security.

A flexible EU that gives groups of member states the opportunity to forge ahead where others can follow.

It also needs to get much better at telling the story – especially to a new generation of Europeans. For them, ‘Never again’ apparently isn’t convincing enough anymore. Not in my own country, at least. And a new political momentum against shortsigtedness and inwardlookingness.

So, ladies and gentlemen, in closing, let me pose a question: what is that new European narrative that can speak to all generations?

For me, the answer to that question begins with the essence of our European project: the rule of law.

Because our European Union isn’t simply a currency or a market. In that regard, the EU treaties are perfectly clear: it is first and foremost a community of values. They are listed in article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. And their importance seems beyond question:

‘Respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men.’

These are all hard-won principles that need to be maintained and defended. In recent decades they’ve been put into practice in our plural and open societies – sometimes in the face of strong opposition. Previous generations have had to fight to achieve them. And they learned some hard lessons along the way. They concluded that we must put democracy and the rule of law above all else. Because they safeguard the very essence of our freedom: that no one person has the final say. And that justice is politically blind.

The rule of law forms the backbone of our European societies. It provides the safeguards and predictability that are crucial not only for our people, but also for our business communities. It helps people reach their full potential and it helps businesses attract investment. It’s an essential part of who we are as Europeans, with a belief in freedom, equity and inclusion.

It is the rule of law above all, I believe, that makes our societies strong and resilient.

So it is a crucial aspect of our foreign policies as well.

Because a strong society at home, a resilient society, is a springboard for an active and self-assured foreign policy.

Foreign countries see, judge and measure our resilience. The stronger it is, the less vulnerable we are to hybrid threats and diversion. A society’s resilience also reflects the confidence we have in our own institutions, including the judiciary and parliament.

Resilience means standing up for our principles. It means taking action if they are breached, for example by those who incite hate. But it also means making peace with each other if we can.

In closing, I would make this appeal to everyone here in this room: know the principles on which our society is founded. The principles that have enabled you to develop personally, whoever you are. But know also when these principles are under attack, and then, please, be prepared to do something about it.

I know I will continue trying to do that in the future – whatever it may bring.

 

Thank you.