Toespraak van de Commandant der Strijdkrachten tijdens de High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar (OSCE)

Toespraak | 16-02-2016

 [introduction by Ambassador Kopmels]

Thank you, Ambassador Kopmels, and thank you for your invitation to speak here today.

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Colleagues, In January last year, a story was published in the online magazine of the OSCE, entitled: ‘The piano’.

In the article, an OSCE staff member – who had worked in various locations in eastern Ukraine

The article included a photo of aircraft wreckage. In the middle was a small black piano; a child’s toy.

This is what the OSCE staff member recalled, and I quote:

“What we were doing was trying to find clues that would help the authorities identify those who perished, people who had no interest in the Crimea, the Donbas or any other corner of Ukraine.

They were innocent people caught up in the lunacy of the situation. In a way, they represent all the innocent people who are still caught up in this lunacy. Like the airplane passengers, they have no real say.

Working as a monitor can mean many things: facilitating dialogue, negotiating the tricky political waters of engagement with separatist groups, and above all building relationships with the people of Ukraine.

It can also mean witnessing events that will scar them forever, even if they do not yet realize it. “But why the piano?”, the OSCE staff member asked himself. He recalled – and I quote:

“This photo illustrated what was for me the most disturbing of all my memories of that day. The toy survived… the child did not. Why was this allowed to happen in Europe in 2014?”

Ladies and Gentlemen, this is just one personal story of the many OSCE staff members, but this individual described what was on our minds at that time very precisely. “How could this happen in Europe?”

Here we are today. On the occasion of the High--‐Level Military Doctrine Seminar in the beautiful city of Vienna. On the 16th of February 2016.

The situation in Ukraine has undoubtedly sharpened our focus. So has the rhetoric of the Russian political leadership. And we can only conclude that the recent developments have adversely affected our security climate.

Just look at the increased scale and scope of military exercises in Europe. Over the last few years, Russia has conducted huge military exercises, some involving tens of thousands of military personnel and a huge amount of military equipment.

The frequency and scale of these exercises are disturbing, if not alarming, given the fact that many of these exercises – largely conducted in Europe – are what are referred to as ‘no--‐notice’ or ‘snap exercises’.

This type of exercise involves no notification, no warning in advance. At best, notification is given at the start of the exercise.

Ladies and Gentlemen, this current and frequent Russian practice of conducting large--‐scale snap exercises adds to the risk of unintended military incidents, if not conflict.

 It also contributes to the general level of tension. We all know that in a situation of cooperative security, we would have been informed about these exercises well in advance. Under any circumstances.

That is why, in order to protect our common security, NATO responded by taking measures, to reassure their Allies in the eastern part of NATO. It ramped up its manoeuvres, and tripled the number of war games held.

I’m sure that many people could not have imagined these developments a decade ago. Large--‐scale military exercises on European soil, involving thousands of troops. Confrontation. Division. Trust being undermined.

We can only ask ourselves the same question the OSCE staff member asked himself two years ago. Why is this being allowed to happen in Europe… in 2016? In fact, our current relations are so tense and risky, I even hesitated for a moment when asked to address you here today.

Because I figured: why bother to try to re--‐engage on Europe’s security architecture? Yet I also realize that it would be foolish to let the opportunity to speak here today pass me by. Because if we want to continue to ensure peace, stability and prosperity on this continent, we cannot ignore the issue and let Europe’s security architecture erode further.

For erosion has set in already. The commitments of Helsinki, to which we all subscribed, are under strain. One might argue that there is not one commitment of the Helsinki Decalog that has not been trampled upon lately.

Yet, we should all demonstrate a readiness to take each other’s security interests into account. To take each other’s security concerns seriously. And not label them as ‘incorrect’, ‘inopportune’ or ‘politically motivated.”

Even if it requires sustained effort, patience, more patience, and dedication.

Because in the end, all of us face a tangle of thorny problems that jeopardize our common goal. Our common goal of ‘creating a security community from Vancouver to Vladivostok’.

Just as we all face common transnational security threats. Threats, such as Islamist terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber threats, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and human trafficking.

Given the complexity of these threats and the consequences… we cannot fight our enemies with the doctrine of the past. A new multidimensional approach to security is needed. Unity is needed.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the OSCE is a crucial security organism, a sort of defensive ecosystem if you like, because of its function as a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation. After all, with forty years of experience, the OSCE knows what it takes to work towards ‘co--‐operative security’.

It was the OSCE that contributed to the ending of the Cold War. And it was the OSCE that provided the normative framework for the post--‐Cold War system of cooperative security, by introducing the 1990 Charter of Paris and the 1999 Istanbul Document, and fostering consensus around it.

And the OSCE is still fundamental for creating conditions for real dialogue and building trust. Its comprehensive approach, for instance, represents an opportunity. Conflicts, after all, do not revolve around the military component alone.

They also involve issues like the values of human rights, the rule of law, and human freedom and dignity, whatever is necessary to prevent divisions within societies, and whatever is necessary to foster a culture of tolerance, and non--‐discrimination.

However, the agreements concluded in Vienna, aimed at building trust in the military sphere between our states, are just as important.

I’m referring of course to the Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Open Skies Treaty, and the OSCE--‐wide Vienna Document on Confidence and Security--‐Building Measures.

Let’s take the last one as an example, the Vienna Document, as it is due to be revised this year. Through the Vienna Document, we all established rules for notification of any large--‐scale military activity, for military inspections, for military transparency.

And it worked. Every year, in mid--‐December, officials from all participating States gather in this city to exchange information, on our armed forces, our military organization, our manpower, and our major weapon and equipment systems.

We also share information on our defence planning, and on our defence budgets during the year. Furthermore, we use the rules to make inspection visits. Last year, for instance, Latvia and Switzerland each conducted one inspection in northwestern Russia, while the Netherlands conducted an inspection in southwestern Russia, along the border with Ukraine.

Russia uses the Vienna Document on an equal basis for the purpose of that transparency, as was the case with an inspection of the Estonian Defence Forces, in May of last year.

And over the years, the Netherlands has also often welcomed Russian inspectors.2 During one of the inspections we even tried to teach our Russian colleagues how to ride a bicycle. And how to eat raw herring… Not simultaneously, of course.

What I want to say is that the Vienna Document is much like a big toolbox… the perfect recipe for transparency and stability, with a high implementation rate and with on average 90 inspections and 45 evaluation visits conducted each year.

Nonetheless, as we all know, the Document is not fulfilling its purpose, as it is no longer fully in line with current insights, and with the realities of today’s security needs. It is with good reason that there are currently about 20 proposals and draft decisions under discussion in the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation.

Proposals including the lowering of thresholds for prior notifications of military activities. Proposals for enhancing inspection quotas and evaluation visit quotas. Proposals for the inclusion of information on naval forces, and proposals for the creation of OSCE inspections for clarification on military activities.

In other words: quite a bit! So it seems about time to make some significant changes to our mutual arrangements. I’m not talking about general guidelines. Nor minor technical and procedural changes, such as the ones implemented in the 2011 Vienna Document.

I’m talking about more solid ground for future progress… progress that will increase predictability and avoid escalation. Of course I realize that this will ultimately depend on the political will and engagement of all participating states.

Yet I would like to ask: Why not make meaningful changes? Why not tackle the modernization of the Vienna Document, to start with? Why not increase mutual trust in the military field? No matter how deep our perceived disagreements?

 Ladies and Gentlemen, last month, in his first address as OSCE Chairperson--‐in--‐Office, Frank--‐Walter Steinmeier said.

“What will help us move forward are not just acknowledgements of the value of dialogue, but an actual dialogue, sincere and engaged, that does not hesitate to identify breaches of OSCE principles”.

A clear statement, and I could not agree more. Confidence and mutual trust can only be built through open and frank dialogue. That is why I sincerely hope we can abide by our common rules, adapt these rules, and establish new ones where necessary.

 Let us take each other’s security interests into account and listen carefully to each other’s security concerns. Let us rebuild trust.

So that we can guard our precious way of life, to the benefit and well--‐being of our people. So that we can keep Europe secure, in a less secure world.

So that we will never have to ask ourselves again: Why… was this allowed to happen, in Europe?

(…)

Thank you.

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