Toespraak Ploumen tijdens symposium ‘Comprehensive approach, the way forward’

Toespraak | 14-05-2014

Ladies and gentlemen,

‘We will not enjoy security without development and we will not enjoy development without security.’ With this statement, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan summed up one of the most important lessons of this millennium. It is this very notion that lies at the heart of the Dutch comprehensive approach towards security in fragile states.

Security and development go hand in hand. We learned that in places like Afghanistan, South Sudan and Rwanda. The armed forces, diplomats and development actors all have their own experience and expertise. Together with the private sector and NGO’s they can provide truly sustainable solutions.

In the coming minutes I will discuss how their roles and degree of involvement will vary with the context and circumstances. In the various phases of a conflict, different actors have different roles. I will also show you how we bring this theory into practice in Mali. Finally, I will share with you my views on the growing role in all this of police forces.

(Phases of Conflict)

Let me start with the phases of conflict. In the theory of war studies, three phases of instability and conflict are identified that seem particularly relevant here: the pre-conflict phase, the moment of military engagement and the post conflict period.

First: the pre-conflict phase. When tensions rise, development workers, NGO’s and diplomats play key roles in preventing the situation from deteriorating into violence. It’s crucial that in this phase we all share intelligence, analysis and experiences on the ground. We have to get better at that, as shown by the recent developments in South Sudan, where we were all taken by surprise. Again. Knowledge of the political economy and underlying ethnic or religious tensions is crucial. In that sense, working in fragile states is a very political undertaking.

The second phase in the continuum of fragility is that of conflict. When violence erupts, international organizations and NGOs will step up humanitarian aid and mediation efforts, and the international community may decide to intervene militarily. In the comprehensive approach, military engagement in this phase is not done in isolation. Although we – and the media… - tend to see the conflict through a military prism, other parties have a role to play too.

Political and development actors have to prepare for the post-conflict phase in parallel, laying the groundwork for durable peace: disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, reconciliation programmes, and the creation of job programmes for ex-combatants. This is one of the key lessons of the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report, and it’s what the Dutch government and development organizations have been doing in the east of Congo, and what we are trying to do in South Sudan and other places.

When hostilities cease, we enter the third phase: that of stabilisation and reconstruction. Troops will stay on as peacekeepers until the country is able to guarantee security on its own. Disarmament and reconciliation commence, state and peace building programmes are launched, and a peace dividend must be generated and paid out. This is what we did in Kunduz, where we strengthened the justice chain, and at the same time supported national programmes that provided economic opportunities, persuading fighters to surrender their arms.

Development actors play a key role in this phase, and a political one as well. Development activities need to address the root causes of a conflict, and are therefore sometimes more important than they seem at first glance. Take Rwanda: a small country, densely populated, where land for agriculture is scarce. This is where the biggest risk to peace lay in the first years after the genocide. Here, investing in agriculture and food security was one way of generating a peace dividend. This was combined with better and more equal access to land property rights.

As for cooperation, there is rather broad agreement on the need for it, especially as long as there is nothing at stake. But the difficult questions are these: Are we really willing to give up a bit of our space and autonomy and allow others to tell us what’s needed in our domain? Should I really trust my colleagues to help set the agenda for development and diplomacy in fragile states? And are the military willing to engage from the outset with NGO’s and the private sector?

Well, we are certainly working on it. My closest advisors work hand in hand with the Ministry of Defense’s top brass – and that cooperation is built on solid trust. More and more they are sharing analyses, jointly defining the binding constraints and speaking the same language. Real cooperation means give and take. Real cooperation is built on trust.

And as I said: as a government we’ve learned the importance of engaging with civil society, and we put this lesson into practice. Mali is a case in point, as far as the comprehensive approach is concerned. Let me go into this in more detail.

(Mali)

The Netherlands has been a development partner of Mali for 40 years and we’ve successfully invested in education, health and agriculture. But the Tuareg insurgency and the military coup in 2012 changed the situation dramatically.

Instead of carrying on with what we have been doing, it was time to adjust and adapt our activities without neglecting what we’d achieved in the past. Based on a comprehensive vision, the Netherlands launched a security and rule-of-law programme focusing on three things. First, enhancing the quality of the justice sector. Second, making political processes more inclusive so that all voices are heard. And third, improving human security.

This programme is closely related to and complements the work of the UN peace mission MINUSMA – for a good reason, as the ‘i’ in MINUSMA stands for ‘integrated’. It builds on our development program and experience, long-term perspective and knowledge of local partners. And it combines those features with advantages of the MINUSMA mission like staff presence in insecure areas. In other words, it’s about creating synergy and comprehensiveness.

For example, the programme aims to strengthen the criminal justice chain in Mali, working closely with prosecutors, lawyers and the government to boost trust in the rule of law and improve access to justice for ordinary citizens. We build capacities within local government and municipalities, and we support UN Women to train all security forces on prevention of gender-based violence, creating special units in the Northern regions of Mali. To name one small but telling example: women who call to report on sexual violence now get a female police officer on the other end of the line.

The idea is to help build a society where citizens trust the authorities, at all levels. That brings me to another layer in the comprehensive approach: avoidance of a relapse into conflict with the help of police forces.

(Green to blue / the police)

When the international community leaves, there is often a period of renewed insecurity because leaders and domestic forces still lack sufficient legitimacy and capacity: the so-called security gap.

Bridging this gap is not exclusively the task of military forces. Rather, I see a tendency towards using more police capacity. Civil and military police forces are, or should be, sensitive to needs of the population and the justice sector. That’s why I believe we are witnessing a trend in which international presence in fragile states is becoming increasingly ‘blue’ instead of ‘green’, to put it in colorful terms.

I’m confident the Netherlands is well positioned to support this trend, because of the unique abilities and approach of the military police (Koninklijke Marechaussee) and the civil police.

We have vast experience in many conflict situations to build on. I will name a few:

• In Kunduz we trained and mentored the local police forces in the field of community policing.

• Through the support to the EU COPPS mission, Dutch police experts contribute to capacity building in the security sector in the Palestinian Territories.

• At the UN’s request, 30 members of the Dutch military police, the civil police and civil experts are training and advising the South Sudanese police force.

• In Mali, we are currently bringing police officers into the field.

Together with our colleagues from the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Security and Justice, I aim to ramp up our capacity for policing in post conflict situations. Of course we will do this in close co-operation with our multilateral partners the EU and the UN. One option would be to establish a multi-purpose police force that can be deployed abroad rapidly. This would require systematic joint training and preparation. That’s what I call an example of ‘the integrated approach back home’.

Ladies and gentlemen, let me conclude.

The comprehensive approach is not a dogma, neither is it a one-size-fits-all solution. It is a promising concept, well worth further exploration. Real cooperation is at the heart of it. To be effective in a crisis we have to meet before the crisis. That is why I am glad that an exercise like Reliable Sword brings diplomats, development experts, the private sector and the military together.

And that’s why I’m glad Minister Hennis and I are here together. Because together we can move a step closer to Kofi Annan’s vision of a world that enjoys both security and development.

Thank you.