Uniting to support the Responsibility to Protect (Engels)
Gelegenheid: 63e Algemene Vergadering van de VNYour Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,
Introduction
Three years after the adoption of the World Summit Outcome Document, there still is plenty of confusion about the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). People in the Netherlands and elsewhere ask me sometimes: 'What exactly is this Responsibility to Protect?' And: 'What is it supposed to do?' Those who are more familiar with the term can be quite sceptical. Having heard the slogan 'No More Rwandas', some wonder why R2P isn’t doing what they believe it should be doing – in Darfur, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere. A political commentator in my country recently called R2P 'empty humanitarian rhetoric'.1
So there is confusion, frustration and scepticism about R2P. On top of that, there is also a fair amount of opposition. Whereas R2P was agreed and endorsed as part of the 2005 Outcome Document – a historic achievement in my opinion – we must acknowledge that this consensus on R2P was difficult to achieve, and has been very fragile ever since. The Responsibility to Protect is opposed particularly by states that believe R2P infringes on their national sovereignty. They see it as a tool for others to interfere in their domestic affairs; a tool they say that can be misused to advance hidden agendas disguised as lofty principles. Here in the United States, too, R2P is opposed by some, albeit from the other end of the sovereignty argument. The Heritage Foundation, for instance, calls R2P a doctrine that should be treated with extreme caution, as it would compel the United States to act against atrocities occurring in other countries.
A legally binding obligation to take action elsewhere, it is argued, would compromise US independence and national sovereignty.2
If there is one conclusion that can be drawn from all of this, it is that the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect has its work cut out to address the various challenges to the principle. I applaud the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, the Institute for Global Policy, Oxfam International and Refugees International for having taken the initiative to establish the Global Centre. Professor Thomas G. Weiss of the CUNY Graduate Center and Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies deserves special credit for his role in the creation of the Centre.
As one of the first contributors, the Dutch government recognised the need for a Global R2P Centre early on. The Global Centre is a serious institution with a serious and important mission, namely to ensure that R2P is properly understood and put into practice, and to promote and catalyse international action to help countries to prevent or halt mass atrocities. To reconfirm the commitment of the Dutch government to this cause, I am pleased to pledge an additional grant of 500,000 €s to the Global Centre.
Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,
I would now like to delve a little deeper into some aspects of R2P. I will address four points in particular:
1. the scope of R2P
2. R2P and the possible use of force
3. R2P and sovereignty
4. and whether R2P needs to be 'depoliticised'.
I will then sum up and conclude with some observations on putting R2P into practice.
The scope of R2P
First, the scope of R2P. Here, paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document are quite clear. The responsibility to protect aims at preventing and halting four of the most serious crimes, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. These crimes are clearly defined under international law, so there can be no misunderstanding as to what crimes R2P seeks to address.
But there is more to say about the scope of R2P. Central to the principle of the responsibility to protect is the prevention of the four crimes I just mentioned. This is first and foremost a responsibility of each individual state towards its own population. Heads of State and Government at the 2005 World Summit vowed to accept this individual state responsibility and to act in accordance with it. The role of the international community in the prevention phase is to encourage and help states to exercise their responsibility, for instance by helping them to build capacity and by assisting states that are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.3
The essence of prevention is to keep from happening what you fear might happen if no action is taken. This involves a judgment: how likely or probable is it that mass atrocities will occur if we stay on the sidelines and do nothing? In the prevention phase, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity have not been committed – not yet that is.
Some would argue that R2P does not apply unless it is triggered by the actual occurrence of mass atrocities. That, in my view, is a dangerous line of reasoning. If we have to wait every time until atrocities have actually been committed, we will have failed miserably in our responsibility to protect populations. R2P should not head down the same road as some discussions about genocide, with scores of people being killed while legal experts debate the legalities of the term. Preventing mass atrocities is the first line of action for R2P, and lies very much within the scope of the concept. It is the phase where individual states and the international community can probably make the most progress at the least cost.
The toolbox of preventive measures, both at the national and international level, is filled to the brim with instruments that can be used effectively in the framework of R2P. This toolbox dates in large part from before the formulation and adoption of the R2P principle in 2005. I say in large part because one of the most concrete innovations agreed at the same World Summit is the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission. The PBC is an essential addition to the existing toolbox, particularly when it comes to preventing the re-occurrence of conflicts in countries that witnessed crimes against humanity.
For many years, countries and institutions have been working together to improve the lives of people and to promote good governance, the rule of law, democracy, development and respect for human rights. In my opinion, such efforts contribute significantly, either directly or indirectly, to the prevention of atrocities. The same is true of preventive measures such as early warning, mediation and good offices.
This leads me to the conclusion that while the scope of R2P may be narrow in terms of the crimes it applies to, it is very broad in terms of the measures that individual states and the international community can and should take to protect populations against such crimes.
Let me illustrate this by referring to the devastating cyclone that hit Burma earlier this year. Many people were quick to dismiss R2P as irrelevant, because natural disasters do not fall within its scope. Which they don't, I agree. But the response of the Burmese regime to the unfolding humanitarian disaster was so inadequate that it bordered on criminal negligence. During an open debate in the Security Council in May of this year, I made the case that gross negligence and woefully inadequate responses to non-man-made threats may actually worsen human suffering to such an extent that such responses could constitute crimes against humanity. And, as has been pointed out also by Gareth Evans, one of the architects of R2P, in that case the responsibility to protect principle does indeed kick in.4 In my view, therefore, the international community did the right thing by calling upon Burma to act more responsibly in its response to the cyclone and to allow humanitarian access. Although Burma could and should have provided better assistance to its own population right from the start, I think the international indignation about Burma’s lame response did eventually make the generals change their course.
It goes to show that the responsibility of states to protect their populations is broad, in the sense that a whole arsenal of measures is available to help protect populations.
R2P and the use of force
A speech on R2P has to address the issue of military intervention, although R2P would be oversimplified and turned into a caricature if it would focus only on military intervention.
I believe the concept of R2P would not be complete without the military option. However, we should not approach R2P from the wrong end of the spectrum. What comes first, second, third, etcetera, is an array of peaceful diplomatic, humanitarian and other measures to prevent mass atrocities and help protect populations. That is the bulk of R2P work. Only when peaceful means fail and the situation is critical and morally untenable, does collective action, including the use of armed force, emerge as a justifiable option – an option of last resort. To actually exercise this option requires a moral and political decision of considerable weight.
Therefore, on the issue of R2P and the use of force, two elements are essential. First of all: the use of force is only an option of the very last resort. But, secondly, if in the future a 'Rwanda situation' occurs, if such a conscience-shocking tragedy takes place again, this last resort option should not be left unused. In such instances, the Security Council must face up to its responsibility and authorise the use of force. If it does not do so, and if an impending tragedy unfolds, this will erode the authority and legitimacy of the Security Council and of the UN as a whole. Moreover, history has shown that not acting in such situations may lead to the unilateral use of force by States, bypassing the Security Council, in an attempt to end a humanitarian tragedy. But this will also erode the authority and the legitimacy of the Security Council and the UN as a whole. Therefore, at such tragic moments, no stone must be left unturned to activate the Council and to make the system work.
R2P and sovereignty
My third point is about R2P and sovereignty. R2P meets with the most reluctance among what I would call the 'Friends of Sovereignty'. Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect are depicted as mutually exclusive principles. However, I consider myself to be a 'Friend of R2P' and a 'Friend of Sovereignty'. In my view, the two go hand in hand, and the one cannot do without the other.
I am convinced that the R2P principle is not aimed at eroding or undermining the principle of national sovereignty. Rather, it seeks to promote responsible conduct by governments – responsible sovereignty. For R2P to succeed, it needs a form of sovereignty that accepts responsibility for protecting its population. Or, if it is unable to do so effectively on its own, a form of sovereignty that accepts the support of the international community. So R2P needs sovereignty.
It is the same the other way around. National sovereignty is an empty shell without acceptance of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect. In the twenty-first century, responsibility comes with the sovereignty package – states can no longer opt to ignore it. Fortunately, this is recognised by states. I referred earlier to the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, in which states accept the Responsibility to Protect their populations from mass atrocities and pledge to act in accordance with it. In today’s system of international relations, it seems only logical that peers follow each other's track record and hold each other to account for their actions. The media, the public and civil society around the world will do the same in any case.
R2P constitutes a commitment and a moral framework to promote responsible sovereignty. States that are suspicious of R2P – because they see it as interference in their domestic affairs – might have certain 'accountability issues'. They are reluctant to offer the world a serious explanation for their actions. But in today's interlinked and interdependent world, states can no longer act as if the world around them does not exist. It very much does. Moreover, the world around them takes an active interest in the wellbeing of their populations, too.
A quick word about the argument that R2P would compel states to intervene militarily in other countries and thus would compromise the independence and limit the national sovereignty of the intervening state. To think that, is, in my view, an overestimation of the authority of the United Nations. The United Nations cannot force any nation to deploy military forces to act against atrocities in other countries, and it certainly cannot force the permanent members of the Security Council.
R2P – a politicised concept?
My fourth point: is R2P a polarising concept that needs to be 'depoliticised’? Some argue that we should tone down our use of the concept, because by invoking R2P too loudly and too often, it annoys others and has a counterproductive effect. Another comment that can be heard is that it should not always be Western countries that invoke and defend R2P.
To be honest, I don't quite know what to make of such arguments. Here we have a universally endorsed commitment that provides strong moral guidance for preventing and halting the most serious crimes, and we should be more hush hush about it? It is hard to see why.
I believe that in most cases, putting the R2P principle into practice, especially in the prevention phase, is a rather non-controversial, unspectacular, and non-politicised process. However, sometimes situations can become politicised because a state or a regime refuses to be helped, encouraged or held accountable. Such a state is then likely to make a big fuss about being pressurised, about outside interference in its domestic affairs, about ‘neo-colonial’ designs by Western powers – the works. In my opinion, we should not be distracted by such responses. We should remain steadfast and stay focused on the task at hand, namely to help protect populations in urgent need of protection.
To be sure, a lot of work in preventing mass atrocities can be carried out without putting an R2P label on it every time. We need to develop a better reading of certain situations and an appreciation of what works best in what circumstances. After all, it is the effect that counts. Silent diplomacy, mediation efforts and good offices are usually more effective when carried out discreetly. Fair enough. But when situations risk getting out of hand, and the threat of crimes against humanity and other serious crimes looms large, we should call a spade a spade. R2P is nothing to be ashamed of, unless your conscience is not clear. Of course the Burmese generals were not pleased when we called upon them to let international assistance in to help the victims of the cyclone. Of course they were agitated when we said a natural disaster should not be turned into a man-enhanced catastrophe. But it was our duty and responsibility to react. Should we have remained silent instead?
Is R2P a Western concept? No, it is a universally endorsed concept, which so far, unfortunately, is being promoted and defended mainly by a small group of mainly Western states. It is essential that non-Western states also throw their weight behind the principle.
There are plenty of good reasons to do so. Rwanda, for instance, has been very dedicated to supporting R2P, based on its own dramatic experience of mass atrocities. I am also very pleased that my colleague Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Foreign Minister of Costa Rica, is committed to R2P. I, for my part, am ready to continue a dialogue with other governments on how to achieve a broader support base for R2P.
Putting R2P into practice
Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,
Allow me to recap and add some of my remarks about putting R2P into practice.
- I have argued that R2P is narrow in scope in that it seeks to prevent and stop four well-defined crimes. At the same time, however, there is a broad range of policy instruments that can be employed to implement R2P.
We should review these instruments – the toolbox – and figure out what works best under what circumstances. Some instruments could be added, refined or expanded, such as early warning capabilities, the Secretary-General’s good offices, and other aspects of preventive diplomacy. The Security Council could promote R2P through peacekeeping mandates and by linking it, when appropriate, with the protection of civilians. I would also like to voice my support to the UN Department for Political Affairs for strengthening its mediation and conflict prevention capacity, and I am pleased to announce in this regard that the Dutch government intends to make a substantial financial contribution to DPA's proposal for extra-budgetary support.
- In the public debate about R2P, there is too much focus on the use of force. This obsession with the military option creates all kinds of suspicions, approaches the issue from the wrong end, and prevents a clear understanding of the other ninety-nine per cent of R2P.
We should never tire of putting the force option in the right perspective. The use of force under the banner of R2P is a measure of last resort. States that fear abuse of the R2P principle should be reassured rather than alarmed by the way the concept is defined. If states want to use force to serve their own narrow interests, they cannot credibly do so under the cover of R2P. The Russian military intervention in Georgia is a case in point. Russia made a half-hearted attempt to justify its actions under the banner of R2P, but absolutely no one who is serious about the principle would buy it.
- The principle of the responsibility to protect and the principle of national sovereignty are two sides of the same coin. Sovereignty in the twenty-first century means responsible sovereignty. A state that invokes the sovereignty principle in an attempt to dodge accountability might have something ugly to hide.
The generals in Burma and President Mugabe of Zimbabwe will undoubtedly stick to the old-fashioned interpretation of sovereignty for as long as they can. But what puzzles me is why respectable countries such as South Africa, Vietnam and others sometimes come to their defence. We need to reach out to these countries and try to persuade them to really engage in R2P. The same goes for China and Russia, who have a special responsibility in this regard as permanent members of the Security Council. Why should they care? They should because it is the credibility of the international community, of the UN and of the Security Council, if nothing else, that is at stake.
What is more important: we all agreed that we should never allow another 'Rwanda' to happen.
- There is no need to be shy about using the principle of the Responsibility to Protect. All states have subscribed to it and pledged to act in accordance with it. We should not have to be on the defensive about asking our peers to live up to their commitments.
Having said that, we should develop a better feel for what works best in what circumstances. We need an R2P strategy, including a more concerted effort among like-minded states and civil society to act jointly in the face of challenges to R2P.
Finally, let me recall that R2P constitutes a political commitment and a moral compass that should guide us in these times of 'moral deficit'. This commitment is reinforced by existing legally binding instruments, to which states have subscribed voluntarily, to prevent mass atrocities such as genocide. The success of R2P depends on the willingness of individual states and the international community to use this compass, and to use it wisely. The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, with renewed financial support from the Netherlands, can be a catalyst in assisting states in that task.
Thank you.
1: Kees Homan, 'Een symbool van ronkende humanitaire retoriek', De Volkskrant, 14 May 2008.
2: Steven Groves, 'The U.S. Should Reject the U.N. 'Responsibility to Protect' Doctrine', Backgrounder No. 2130, published by The Heritage Foundation, 1 May 2008.
3: A/RES/60/1, paras.138-139, '2005 World Summit Outcome', 60th UNGA session, 16 September 2005.
4: Gareth Evans, 'Facing Up to Our Responsibilities', The Guardian, 12 May 2008.