Das Europa der Anderen (Engelstalig)
Translation of the Humboldt lecture, originally held in German, given by Minister for European Affairs Frans Timmermans at Humboldt University, Berlin, on 21 May 2007
‘The Europe of Others’
Introduction
‘Europe: now you see it, now you don’t. Those who have been living in Europe for a long time seem to have had enough of it. Those who live elsewhere want to get in at any cost. What is it that some HAVE, but no longer want, while others YEARN for it so much?’
Answering this question by Wim Wenders may be the most important task facing European politicians. Attempts to do so in recent years have met with only limited success. Many Europeans have become disillusioned with the European Union because it is not achieving enough and they do not feel properly represented. It is fashionable nowadays to focus on specific projects when explaining the EU. This approach is certainly important, because specific projects can be used to achieve specific aims. But a purely utilitarian EU, like purely utilitarian politics, is rather impoverished.
I have been a big fan of Herbert Grönemeyer for many years. The song he sang about his deceased wife several years ago made an indelible impression on me. But Grönemeyer is not just a great singer about personal life; he is also a great singer about politics. His latest album ‘12’ holds up a mirror to us politicians which faithfully reveals all our furrows and wrinkles, all our blemishes, large and small. In ‘Die Flüsternde Zeit’, he sings about our lack of inspiration, particularly regarding the Constitutional Treaty:
Der Sommer war gross
Das Wetter überreif
Aber ihr, ohne Idee, im Abseits
Ihr spielt nur zum Schein
lasst uns hinten allein
Für euren Vertrag fällt euch zu wenig ein
In einer flüsternden, flüsternden Zeit
Paradoxically, to discover what we Europeans have in common, we must first become more aware of how we differ – and show genuine interest in these differences. An interview with two members of the European Parliament, Michel Rocard from France and Adina Valean from Romania, which appeared in the run-up to the EU’s 50th anniversary celebrations, expresses these differences clearly.
Rocard, a veteran politician, says he cried when Valean, together with 52 colleagues from Romania and Bulgaria, walked into the European Parliament in Strasbourg to ‘take their place in Europe’. It reminded him of 1989, when, as French prime minister, he watched as the hated Nicolae Ceaucescu was driven from power.
Valean, almost 40 years his junior, felt ‘only pride’ as she entered the hall. And her pride was primarily for Romania – not Europe. Because as she opened the door to the European Parliament, she heard the door of the old dictatorship slam shut behind her: ‘Freedom was the only thing we thought of when we thought of Europe.’ Rocard had brought Europe to Romania, but Valean brought Romania to Europe. And I’m not just playing with words here. For those of us who have been enjoying freedom since 1945, the European Union has always meant the victory of solidarity over destructive nationalism. Relativising the nation-state played a key part in this. For those who suffered under foreign domination and dictatorship until 1989, the national freedom they have regained is the greatest victory in their history. In those countries, emphasising the nation-state is an expression of the triumph of liberty. This difference in outlook between the old and new member states is rarely voiced, but it is still slumbering beneath the surface and all too often gives rise to misunderstandings.
Kremlin on the Senne
For me, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the destruction of the Iron Curtain represent the absolute climax of Europe’s success story. For years, Warsaw, Prague and Bucharest could just as well have been located on the dark side of the moon as far as Western Europe was concerned. Nowadays, you can travel there just as easily as to London or Paris. And the best thing is that this freedom is regarded as the most natural thing in the world. This is a tremendous step forward. However, the sudden proximity of the old and new member states also conceals the discrepancies between them.
At the same time as Western European countries were starting to share their sovereignty, the countries behind the Iron Curtain were also busy integrating. The difference is that they did not do so voluntarily, but under totalitarian pressure from Moscow. Less than 20 years ago, half of Europe consisted of countries founded on an institutionalised form of mutual mistrust. That explains the mixture of repugnance and fascination we feel when we watch a film like ‘Das Leben der Anderen’ (The Lives of Others) by director Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck. Did people really treat one another like that?
The arrival of freedom finally enabled the Poles, Hungarians and Czechs to take their fate into their own hands and reclaim their national pride. Like Western Europe, the former Eastern Bloc countries owe the EU a great deal: their economic growth speaks volumes in this regard. But as in the older member states, the EU gets little credit for this. A recent opinion poll showed, for example, that the Latvians are the most eurosceptical of all Europeans. Only 28% saw membership as a good idea. Why? Because of the EU’s supposed resemblance to the hated, centrally controlled Soviet Union. Exchanging communist Moscow for bureaucratic Brussels is the last thing they want.
People draw the same parallel in many other new member states. That is shocking; but it is understandable that the scars of a very traumatic – and very recent – past are not easily erased. What is more, many Central and Eastern Euro pean countries have the impression that they are playing second fiddle to the older member states. Security is therefore more important than the famous Brussels fleshpots: the older member states ought to show more understanding for the preoccupation of many new member states with their security. We sometimes forget that the Cold War was a lot colder for them. They do not want to run any risks with their regained liberty.
New member states often have to get used to the fact that EU membership is not the end of a process, but the beginning of a new role in a broader context. That broader context is not a new Warsaw Pact or a mini-UN. The European Union is not a traditional international organisation. It is more, and therefore sets higher standards for its members.
The old member states must realise that the end of the division of Europe is also transforming our own part of the world and our perception of the European partnership. The idea that newcomers to the EU still have to adapt to the older members is wrong. They are no longer ‘others’. Their accession has changed the EU – and that means all of us. The fact that Brussels is frequently seen as a new Moscow is therefore our problem too.
Self-hate
At the end of the Second World War, the nation-states, having run amuck, were in a state of utter collapse. The ‘pooling’ of sovereignty – in other words, the EEC (and later the EC and the EU) – actually revived the nation-state. Sixty years later the world is again on the threshold of a new era. Globalisation is changing international relations at breakneck speed. Once again the EU is the obvious organisation that will enable nation-states – individually and collectively – to successfully meet this challenge.
But many do not share this view. The EU is sometimes seen as having reached the end of its tether. ‘From now on, it can only decline,’ some people say. ‘We need to hold on to what we have,’ say others. By putting an end to division, has Europe really reached the end of its history? Never before has a peace project that looked so hopeless achieved such success. But it is equally unprecedented for a success story to experience so much self-doubt.
Well-known Dutch advertising agents claim that nothing could be easier than to sell the EU to the public. ‘The EU is like the Ferrari among cars: luxurious, comfortable and everyone wants to be in it.’ The European Union has an incredible brand identity: ‘If you mention the EU, everyone knows what you’re talking about.’ If the EU had been run by an insurance company or a bank, everyone would be queuing up for it by now – say the advertising agents.
You wonder where these people were during the referendum campaign on the EU Constitution. At that time, supporters and opponents in the Netherlands were tumbling over one another with conflicting visions of Europe. No matter how much energy, money and commitment you put into promoting the European Union as a ‘product’, more is needed to arouse public enthusiasm than harking on about its advantages – however great they may be.
Many people attribute the ‘no’ vote on the EU Constitution to a lack of information. ‘By denying people information about the EU, politicians left them prey to their gut feelings,’ they say. That was also my own initial reaction. But this underestimates the public. Naturally, you need to try to convince people of the value of European cooperation by pointing to its past achievements. But a lack of information was not ultimately the decisive factor: if only it were.
The truth is that most Dutch people did not like the message. However important the EU may have been for our stability, security and prosperity, in the end this was not enough to justify further European integration. Progress does not mean duplicating yesterday’s successes. It means seizing current opportunities and warding off tomorrow’s threats. And to do that, Europe must reinvent itself.
Reinventing itself
There is an urgent need for Europe to reinvent itself. At the same time, we must not close our eyes to the uncertainty that many Europeans feel. You can only be open to the future if you have both feet firmly on the ground. If the ground you are standing on is shifting, you automatically look downwards instead of forwards. A future-oriented debate on the EU can only succeed if fundamental certainties are no longer being questioned.
Eliminating people’s uncertainty requires a more effective EU. This means that the present treaties need to be overhauled. The vigorous efforts being made by the German EU Presidency to find a way out of the debate on a new treaty are therefore very welcome. But don’t expect this to make people think more positively about Europe. The problem is that the debate on a new treaty magnifies the conflicts between ‘us’ and ‘others’, and thereby prevents people from seeing the real Europe – the Europe of ideals. The sooner we can achieve a compromise acceptable to all member states, the sooner we can focus all our attention on the tremendous challenges facing the EU and its citizens.
But for this we need a treaty that can meet the needs of our time. The Netherlands has a clear picture of how such a treaty should look. We certainly have no intention of asking the Dutch parliament to ratify the Constitutional Treaty that the Dutch people have already rejected. The new treaty must differ fundamentally from its predecessor in name, form and content.
For the institutional compromise to remain intact, the Netherlands needs to see changes in five areas.
Constitutional nature
Firstly, we need to abandon the constitutional pretensions of a new treaty. I contributed to the European Constitution as a Dutch MP at the Convention. At the time, it seemed a good idea to use the terminology in common use at national level to make the EU more recognisable. This meant, for example, speaking of a ‘minister’ rather than a ‘high representative’, and of ‘acts’ and ‘framework acts’ rather than ‘directives’ and ‘regulations’.
‘Scrap Eurospeak’ was our slogan. But of course that was not enough to justify the term ‘Constitution’. The treaty referred to the EU flag and the EU anthem because such things are commonly found in a Constitution. It was also decided to incorporate the entire EU Charter of Fundamental Rights into the text.
This created great confusion among the public, for don’t nearly all European countries already have a Constitution? The Dutch have never shown much awareness of their country’s Constitution. In the political debate and in education, the national Constitution generally leads a dormant existence. The EU changed that. Suddenly our attention was focused on the Constitution – but our own Constitution!
In retrospect, it was a big mistake to dress up what was essentially a simple amending treaty in constitutional clothes. Making links with the national frame of reference gave the unintended impression that the EU wanted to supplant the nation-state. And that had a negative impact at a time when, due to all the changes they are facing from outside influences, people are seeking a sense of security in what they are familiar with – and that means in the first place their own country.
The new treaty must therefore simply amend existing treaties – just like the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice. Giving it constitutional trappings creates the impression that the EU has the ambition of becoming a superstate, which only fuels euroscepticism. However important the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights may be, the new treaty need only refer to its applicability to the perfo rmance of EU tasks, and this will avert fresh misunderstandings about the treaty’s intentions. This approach will make the treaty not only more compact but also more honest. Because Europe is not a state.
Democratic content
Secondly, the EU’s democratic functioning needs to be improved. The spectre of a European superstate has aroused confusion and unease and turned many Dutch people against the Constitution. People were told that the EU would prevent us from being ourselves any more. The Netherlands would allegedly disappear from the map. A poster published by the ‘no’ camp graphically portrayed this fear. It showed a map of the EU on which national boundaries were shown in thick lines and the individual member states were given contrasting colours. One country was missing: the Netherlands. It had disappeared into the North Sea.
The Netherlands is not the only country in Europe whose inhabitants look to the nation-state for protection against growing outside influences. In Rome there is currently an exhibition to mark the 50th anniversary of European integration. All member states were asked to submit a work of art expressing their national characteristics. For events like this, member states used to look for what made them typically European, whereas today the emphasis is on their own individuality within the larger European whole.
Such an attitude does not necessarily present a threat to the EU – on the contrary. But the EU shouldn’t be afraid to link up with such national sentiments. National parliaments are ideally equipped to ‘europeanise’ the national debate and ‘nationalise’ the European debate. And that is a precondition for finally involving the public in the EU. It does, however, mean that the EU needs to recognise more emphatically than it has done to date that national parliaments are the focal point of political interest and the political debate among Europeans – and not Brussels or Strasbourg.
That is why it is so important for the new treaty to further strengthen the role of national parliaments. The Constitutional Treaty took a step in this direction by introducing the ‘yellow card’: the idea that if a third of the parliaments lodge an objection against a proposal by the European Commission, based on subsidiarity or proportionality, the Commission must reconsider its proposal. But if we sincerely want to give our people a greater say in the EU through their own parliaments, we must have the courage to go further. For example, by stipulating that the Commission must withdraw a proposal if a clear majority believes that it fails the subsidiarity or proportionality test.
Division of powers
Thirdly, a new treaty must make it clearer which powers we are giving to the EU and which we are not. The basic principle must be that decisions should consistently be taken as close to the citizens as possible. The EU must take action only if member states are unable to achieve their objectives by themselves. In some cases, of course, it may be better for a decision to be taken at EU level and in that case majority decision-making will generally be appropriate. But a European solution should be the outcome of a well-reasoned decision, not the standard response to any problem.
In recent years, lack of clarity about competences has led the EU to interfere more than once with member states’ public services. But not everything needs to be subject to the rules of the internal market. When it comes to pensions, social security, taxes, culture, education and health care, member states should be free to guarantee the quality, affordability and accessibility of their own public services. This means that the powers of member states and the EU must be more sharply delimited than they are at present.
Enlargement
Fourthly, the rules for enlargement must be incorporated into the new treaty. Countries that would like to join the EU must become truly European countries. This means that they must uphold democracy and the rule of law, respect human rights, protect minorities, be able to withstand competition from other EU countries and adopt EU rules and regulations. In EU jargon, these conditions for becoming a member state are known as the ‘Copenhagen criteria’.
Joining the EU changes not only the new member states but also the EU as a whole. The old member states, and their citizens too, have gradually become more aware of this. As a result, candidate countries are not automatically welcomed with open arms. To ensure public support for the EU in the future, we therefore need to make it absolutely clear that there will be no haggling about the requirements for membership. That is why we need to include the Copenhagen criteria in the new treaty.
More effective
Fifthly and finally, the new treaty must make the EU demonstrably more effective when joint action by the member states is required. In today’s world, individual member states face numerous challenges that they cannot tackle alone. If we truly want to make progress on climate change, immigration or the fight against terrorism, a more European approach is required. And there are many more areas to which this applies. Examples include our energy supply, our environment, our economies’ competitiveness, our common foreign and security policy and the problem of transnational crime.
Europe is a model of a society of freedom, responsibility and solidarity. It sets an example for the rest of the world. Only if the EU and the member states – focused on the same aims but on the basis of their own responsibilities – work together more efficiently and succeed in involving their citizens, can we preserve what we have achieved. The Netherlands favours not so much less Europe as a better Europe.
Conclusion
Schöneberg City Hall is just around the corner. On 10 November 1989 Willy Brandt addressed a crowd of thousands of people there, from East and West. ‘Nothing will ever be the same again,’ he said. ‘This means that we in the West, too, will be judged not only by what we have said in the past, but also by what we are able and willing to do and achieve today and tomorrow, intellectually and physically. (...) Our readiness, not to preach but to show solidarity, seek common ground and begin anew will be put to the test. The task at hand is to pull together, keep a cool head and do our best.’
Next October, it will be 15 years since Willy Brandt died. Times may have changed radically since that autumn night in Berlin, but his message remains as timely as ever. Not only in Berlin or in Germany, but in the whole of Europe. Precisely because of the unprecedented transformation that the world has undergone, and is still undergoing, the differences that we thought we had surmounted – between old-timers and newcomers, East and West, big and small, Atlanticists and non-Atlanticists – are threatening to raise their heads again.
The EU is the work of human beings. Everything we have built can also be destroyed. In the words of Willy Brandt, I hear an ongoing call for us to focus on what binds us – Berliners, Germans, Europeans – and not what divides us.
Our social market economy makes Europe a showcase of responsibility and solidarity. Europeans have a great deal in common, in terms of both what we consider important and how we try to achieve it. What is important to us? Relaxed social relations, good education for all, universally accessible health care, an equitable partnership between employers and employees, a solid social safety net and a healthy environment. And how do we try to achieve all this? Through our culture of dialogue: the quest for political consensus and social solidarity.
Naturally, I am not blind to the differences within the EU. But viewed on a global scale, our similarities are many times greater than our differences. Europe is a role model for a society of freedom, solidarity and responsibility, if we are only willing to recognise this.
Herbert Grönemeyer mercilessly exposes our failings, and the risk that we will fail completely if we refuse to meet each other halfway:
Der Sommer war gross
Das Wetter gut heiss
Aber ihr steht weit im Abseits
Wenn Eure Stunde Schlagt
Ist es zu spat
Weil ihr habt euch zuwenig bewegt
Zuwenig bewegt
We will only succeed in mobilising the public again if we mobilise ourselves first. Without capable politicians, there will be no capable citizens. We must put an end to ‘die flüsternde Zeit’ (this time of faint voices). Europe needs passion, not only in those waiting outside the door, but also among its own citizens. Europe does not belong to ‘others’. Europe belongs to us all.