Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken
---
Aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal Binnenhof 4 Den
Haag Directie Politieke Zaken Bezuidenhoutseweg 67 2594 AC Den Haag
Datum 30 januari 2002 Auteur L. ten Hagen
Kenmerk DPZ/010-02 Telefoon 070 - 348 52 74
Blad /2 Fax 070 - 348 46 38
Bijlage(n) 1 E-mail DPZ@minbuza.nl
Betreft Informatievoorziening aan de Tweede Kamer over de rapportage van het
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden inzake de uitvoering van Veiligheidsraadresolutie
1373
Zeer geachte Voorzitter,
Graag bied ik u hierbij mede namens de Ministers van Justitie, Binnenlandse
Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties en Financiën de rapportage van het Koninkrijk
der Nederlanden inzake de uitvoering van Veiligheidsraadresolutie 1373 (28
september 2001) aan. Deze rapportage is conform paragraaf 6 van de resolutie
voor 27 december 2001 aan de Verenigde Naties aangeboden.
Om de uitvoering van resolutie 1373 te monitoren is het Counter-Terrorism
Committee (CTC) opgericht. De voorzitter van het CTC, de Britse Permanente
Vertegenwoordiger bij de VN Greenstock, heeft op 18 januari jl. in een
openbaar debat van de Veiligheidsraad meegedeeld dat inmiddels 122
rapportages zijn ontvangen. Naar verwachting zal het CTC eind april alle
rapporten hebben bestudeerd. Het CTC zal n.a.v. ieder rapport zijn
commentaar, variërend van een verzoek om meer informatie tot aanbevelingen
inzake wetgeving of uitvoeringsmaatregelen, vertrouwelijk overbrengen aan de
betrokken regering. Het CTC zal geen oordelen over de rapportages vellen in
de zin van 'voldoende' of 'onvoldoende'. Voornaamste doel van het CTC is de
capaciteit van regeringen om terrorisme te bestrijden te vergroten, te
inventariseren of een land daartoe wellicht assistentie behoeft en bij het
bieden van die assistentie te faciliteren. Eventuele politieke controverses
zullen worden verwezen naar de Veiligheidsraad.
Namens de EU heeft het Spaanse voorzitterschap melding gemaakt van de
bereidheid van de Unie om, in aanvulling op de assistentie op een aantal
relevante terreinen die de EU reeds in een groot aantal derde landen biedt,
verdere ondersteuning te bieden, waarbij het CTC de nuttige rol van
'clearing house' kan spelen.
In dit verband zij op gemerkt dat de Rijksministerraad op 30 november 2001
een gezamenlijk verklaring inzake terrorismebestrijding, opgesteld door de
drie landen van het Koninkrijk, heeft aangenomen. Op grond van het in de
verklaring opgenomen actieplan, zal Nederland waar nodig bijstand verlenen
aan de Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba.
De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken
Report pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373
Kingdom of the Netherlands
22 December 2001
The following is the report pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (28
September 2001) detailing measures taken by the Kingdom of the
Netherlands for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373
(28 September 2001), following the format set out in the guidelines
circulated by the Chairman of the Committee established under UNCSR 1373
(SCA/20/01(6)).
This national report has to be read in conjunction with the parallel report
by the European Union on behalf of its member states.
General introduction
Following September 11th, the Netherlands compiled an action plan containing
45 new measures against terrorism. This action plan has been presented to
the national parliament. Regular progress reports on its implementation will
also be presented to parliament. The action plan is attached in the annex.
Within the Kingdom an overall action plan has been put in place and agreements have been reached between the countries on:
the strengthening of legislation to combat terrorism;
strenghening of cooperation between the police- and the justice departments
of the countries;
the creation of an adequate infrastructure for the information position of
the national security departments;
the strengthening of control mechanisms for the financial sector.
The action plan also provides a clear time-schedule; implementation and
follow-up will be monitored by the Kingdom Council of Ministers. No English
translation is available as yet.
1 (a) What measures if any have been taken to prevent the suppression of
terrorist acts in addition to those listed in your responses to 1b and 1d?
The Kingdom of the Netherlands acknowledges the great importance of
effectively combating the financing of terrorism in various national and
international contexts.
The national action plan mentioned in the general introduction contains 14
measures related to the integrity of the financial sector and the prevention
of the financing of terrorist activities.
Elaborating on these 14 measures the Minister of Finance and the Minister
of Justice presented to parliament a detailed memorandum concerning numerous
existing and planned measures to further strengthen the integrity of the
financial sector and to prevent the financing of terrorist activities. A
translation of this memorandum is attached in the annex.
The eight Special Recommendations adopted by the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) at its Extraordinary Plenary Meeting on 29 and 30 October 2001 will
be implemented in all parts of the Kingdom as soon as possible, in
accordance with the agreements reached by the FATF, and by June 2002 at the
latest. The Kingdom will submit the self-evaluation required and the action
plan for implementing the eight Special Recommendations to the FATF before
the end of 2001. In 2002 an expert meeting will be held at Kingdom level to
review the system for combating money laundering and the financing of
terrorism and, if necessary, to recommend improvements. It is intended that
some of these recommendations be implemented via measures and regulations
taken at EU level.
1 (b) What are the offences and penalties in your country with respect to
the activities listed in this sub-paragraph?
The financing of terrorism is a criminal offence under the Dutch Criminal
Code. It can be prosecuted in three ways.
Firstly, as preparations for a criminal act under article 46 of the Criminal
Code. The maximum penalty depends on the maximum penalty applying to the
terrorist crime for which the financing was intended. In this case, the
terrorist act need not actually have been committed. Secondly, as financing
in the context of a criminal organisation. In this case the suspect can be
prosecuted for participating in a criminal organisation (under article 140
of the Criminal Code). The maximum penalty for this is six years'
imprisonment. A bill is to be submitted to parliament in the very near
future introducing a specific provision (article 140a) regarding membership
of terrorist organisations. The proposed maximum penalty is eight years'
imprisonment. Thirdly, the financing of terrorism can be prosecuted as
participation in an offence, such as conspiracy to incite a terrorist
offence (whether successful or not), under articles 46a and 47 of the
Criminal Code. The maximum penalties again depend on the maximum penalty
applying to the terrorist offence for which the financing was intended.
Under the Dutch Criminal Code it is possible to hold both natural and legal persons criminally liable for offences committed, and therefore also for the financing of terrorism (article 51 of the Criminal Code).
Bills for the implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism have recently been approved. The legislation will enter into force on January 1, 2002.
Dutch sanctions legislation is also relevant to 1 (d). Under the Sanctions
Act (Sanctiewet 1977), the government can implement international sanctions
by means of a national decree. Violation of the Sanction Act can be
prosecuted under the Economic Offences Act.
The penalties for intentionally violating the Sanctions Act are now:
imprisonment for a maximum of 2 years or a maximum fine of NLG 25,000. In
the absence of intent, the penalties are a maximum of 6 months' imprisonment
or a maximum fine of NLG 25,000. It has been proposed that the maximum
penalties be raised to: imprisonment for a maximum of 6 years or a maximum
fine of NLG 100,000 for violation with intent, and imprisonment for a
maximum of 1 year or a maximum fine of NLG 25,000 for violations without
intent.
See also 1 (c) for further details on the Sanctions Act and proposed
amendments.
See also 2 (d) and (e) for further details on proposed changes to the
Criminal Code.
1 (c) What legislation and procedures exist for freezing accounts and assets
at banks and financial institutions? It would be helpful if States supplied
examples of any relevant action taken.
In general, financial measures ensuing from UNSC resolutions are implemented
via EU Regulations, which are directly applicable in the Netherlands. The
general procedures followed in the case of resolutions 1267 and 1333 are
listed in the EU report referred to above.
After September 11 the Netherlands issued the following three
ministerial orders based on the 1977 Sanctions Act, pending European
implementation:
On 8 October the Dutch government issued a ministerial order immediately
freezing the assets of 27 persons and organisations listed in the
Presidential Order issued by President Bush.
On 12 October the Dutch government issued another order immediately freezing
the assets of 39 persons and organisations included on the US Treasury
Department list of 12 October.
Most recently, on 8 November, a ministerial order was issued freezing the
assets of 62 persons and organisations on the US Treasury Department list of
7 November.
The three ministerial orders were issued before the UN Taliban Sanctions
Committee had decided on the freezing of listed assets.
Once the names of the persons concerned had been added to EU Regulation
467/2001 (dated 6 March 2001), the three orders above were withdrawn since
EU regulations are directly applicable in the Netherlands. Since the orders
were withdrawn, EU regulations have formed the basis for freezing
terrorists' assets in the Netherlands.
The most recent list of 22 terrorist organisations issued by the United
States on 2 November has been brought to the attention of Dutch financial
organisations. They have been requested to check their records for possible
similarities.
After President Bush issued a first presidential order on 27 September, De
Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) merged the list it contained with the confidential
list issued by the FBI (sent to DNB at its request). Names that came up in
national intelligence activities or as a result of information exchange with
foreign intelligence agencies were also added. DNB brought the consolidated
list - totalling more than 500 names - to the attention of the private banks
it supervises by issuing a circular requesting them to check the names of
their account holders against those of persons and organisations it
featured. DNB followed the same procedure with the other lists that were
issued during the months of October and November. The national Pensions and
Insurance Board (PVK) and the Securities Board (STE) also responded
accordingly.
So far one bank account has formally been frozen on the basis of the UN
list. This account belongs to DA Afghanistan Bank, and the balance stood at
US$495,285.96. Financial supervisors identified a number of other possible
hits that are now under investigation. Information on possible matches
belonging to entities named on lists and not in the public domain is
confidential.
The Council of the European Union reached agreement on a Common Position and
a Regulation (described in detail in the EU report) to allow the EU to adapt
to the wider scope of measures covered by UNSC 1373 and to be able to reach
persons who commit, attempt to commit, participate in or facilitate
terrorist acts, but are not linked to any one state.
Nationally, the Netherlands is preparing similar amendments to the
aforementioned 1977 Sanctions Act, in addition to those listed under 1 (b).
In this context, the Netherlands is currently preparing an amendment to the
Sanctions Act from which the restriction concerning "states or certain
territories" will be removed. The new legislation will enable the
authorities to implement international sanctions (financial or otherwise)
against persons and entities that commit, attempt to commit or facilitate
terrorist acts. Supervision of compliance with the Act will also be
strengthened. This will ensure that financial institutions' attempts to
freeze the accounts of terrorists and prohibit providing funds to terrorists
will be more effective. Parliament is likely to consider amendments on the
Sanctions Act in the first half of 2002.
In Aruba, a legal possibility exists to freeze bank accounts of people who
are the subject of a criminal investigation, i.e. if there is a suspicion
that criminal acts as described in the Criminal Code were committed. The
freezing of accounts is also possible in case of a request for mutual legal
assistance in criminal matters, i.e. when on behalf of a criminal
investigation in a foreign country, money has to be seized in Aruba.
Futhermore it is possible to seize bankaccounts and confiscate money or
assets of persons against whom a confiscation order was issued in a foreign
country.
In the Netherlands Antilles, articles 4 and 4b of the Foreign Exchange
Ordinance contain provisions for the freezing of accounts and assets at
banks and financial institutions, who must report to the Central Bank
whether or not they maintain accounts or have assets of persons indicated in
the ministerial order.
1 (d) What measures exist to prohibit the activities listed in this
sub-paragraph?
See paragraphs 1 (a), (b) and (c).
2 (a) What legislation or other measures are in place to give effect to this
sub-paragraph? In particular, what offences in your country prohibit
recruitment to terrorist groups, and
the supply of weapons to terrorists?
What other measures help prevent such activities?
Recruitment to terrorist groups can be dealt with under criminal law in the
Netherlands as incitement to any criminal offence or violent action against
the public authorities (articles 131 and 132 of the Criminal Code). It can
also be prosecuted as actual or attempted incitement to commit a criminal
offence (under articles 46a and 47 of the Criminal Code).
Unlicensed trade in weapons is an offence under the Weapons and Ammunition Act. A licence application will always be refused if the applicant cannot be trusted to have weapons in his or her possession, if it is feared the weapons will be misused or if there is another pressing reason why the application should be refused in the common interest.
Where necessary, arms export regulations applying throughout the Kingdom
will be amended or extended to allow effective monitoring of the import,
transit and export of strategic goods, including financial involvement with
such movements. In addition, the rules on the transit of strategic goods
will be tightened up in the very near future (with effect from 1 January
2002). This will make it easier to prevent the transit of weapons to
undesirable destinations.
With regard to European measures on control of arms acquisition, reference
is made to the EU report.
2 (b) What other steps are being taken to prevent the commission of
terrorist acts, and in particular, what early warning mechanisms exist to
allow exchange of information with other states?
For cooperation within the framework of the EU, see the EU report.
National: As part of its statutory duties, the National Security Service (BVD) investigates persons and organisations that might be involved in preparing or supporting terrorist activities. The BVD operates proactively in this respect. As regards the prevention of terrorist activities, the Intelligence and Security Services Act includes a provision stipulating that the holders of personal data are obliged to make them available to the BVD.
In the Netherlands the Public Prosecution Service is responsible for investigating and prosecuting crime, in which context it exercises authority over the police service. The National Public Prosecutor for Combating Terrorism (LOvJ) coordinates the fight against terrorism (or rather, the response to specific terrorist threats). The LOvJ and BVD cooperate closely.
The Ministry of Justice (which includes the Immigration and Naturalisation Service), the Public Prosecution Service and the BVD exchange information on individuals concerning whom there is evidence of involvement in or support for terrorist activities. The BVD also continuously cooperates and exchanges information with the Royal Military Police in this area.
International: The BVD works closely with foreign intelligence and security
services. This includes the continuous exchange of information, which
produces an early warning system. The services also have special liaison
officers for this. For instance, the BVD has specially appointed
counterterrorist liaison officers to assist in cooperation within the
European Union and NATO. It also has liaisons for special operational
matters. Where necessary, international networks are created to respond to
particular matters.The part of the BVD participating in the network also
answers questions from other countries. There is also a Bureaux de Liaison
network which the EU countries' intelligence and security services are
affiliated to. It allows countries to inform each other in a secure manner
of any terrorist incident that has occurred or been prevented. Finally, the
BVD has recently linked up to the international exchange of information
through the Europol channel, seconding a staff member to Europol for the
purpose.
2 (c) What legislation or procedures exist for denying safe haven to
terrorists, such as laws for excluding or expelling the types of individuals
referred to in this sub-paragraph? It would be helpful if States supplied
examples of any relevant action taken.
Secondary universal jurisdiction with respect to major terrorist crimes has
been established in the Dutch Criminal Code. This means that in cases where
the Netherlands does not extradite a person suspected of committing a
terrorist offence, it is obliged to prosecute the individual in question in
the Netherlands. This prevents terrorists from finding a safe haven in the
Netherlands.
Additional information can be found under 3 (c), (f) and (g).
The EU has reached political agreement on a Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and procedures to simplify extradition between EU member states. In addition, the Netherlands will make every effort to ratify the EU Legal Assistance Agreement by the end of 2002.
For further European measures, see the EU report.
2 (d) What legislation or procedures exist to prevent terrorists acting from
your territory against other states or citizens? It would be helpful if
States supplied examples of any relevant action taken.
Article 140 of the Criminal Code, whereby it is an offence to participate in a criminal organisation, does not only apply to organisations whose aim is to commit criminal offences in the Netherlands. This means that a person in the Netherlands who participates in an organisation whose aim is to commit criminal offences abroad, is committing a criminal offence under Dutch law.
With a view to implementing the EU-Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism
an amendment is being proposed for an additional article 140a of the
Criminal Code, introducing participation in a terrorist organisation as a
separate offence. The penalties for participation in a terrorist
organisation (140a) will be higher than those for participation in a
criminal organisation (140).
See also 2 (c) , 2 (e) and 2 (g) and the reply by the European Union.
2 (e) What steps have been taken to establish terrorist acts as serious
criminal offences and to ensure that the punishment reflects the seriousness
of such terrorist acts? Please supply examples of any convictions obtained
and the sentence given.
The Netherlands has ratified ten of the twelve UN antiterrorism
conventions. The two remaining (on terrorist bomb attacks and financing)
will be ratified in January 2002. As a result, all offences laid down in the
twelve existing UN antiterrorism conventions are criminal offences in the
Netherlands.
The EU has agreed on a Framework Decision on combating terrorism. The
agreement includes a common definition of various types of terrorist
offences and serious criminal sanctions. Participation in a terrorist
organisation must be subject to a minimum sentence of eight years'
imprisonment, leadership of such an organisation to 15 years' imprisonment.
For other European measures, see the response by the EU.
The Netherlands will submit a bill for the implementation of the aforementioned Framework Decision early in 2002. It will include several amendments to the Criminal Code and other relevant legislation. This will include the addition of a new separate article 140a regarding participation in terrorist organisations, with heavier sentences attached than in the case of participation in criminal organisations (see also 2-d).
Heavier sentences will also be introduced for several other serious crimes, if it is proved that the crime was committed with a terrorist aim.
2 (f) What procedures and mechanisms are in place to assist other states? Please provide any relevant details of how these have been used in practice.
Extensive procedures are already in place for the exchange of information between intelligence and security services, as described in 2 (b). Assistance with terrorism investigations being conducted by services in other countries already enjoyed high priority before September 11 . The events of September 11 have led to cooperation and information exchange being stepped up, including for financial investigations.
Another form of mutual assistance is the ever-increasing cooperation between
FATF member states in the fight against money laundering and the financing
of terrorism.
The twelve UN conventions for the combating of terrorism can also provide a
basis for extradition and legal assistance, alongside the existing bilateral
and multilateral extradition and legal assistance treaties (see also 3 (c)).
2 (g) How do border controls in your country prevent the movement of
terrorists?
How do your procedures for issuance of identity papers and travel documents
support this?
What measures exist to prevent their forgery etc?
The EU is discussing stepping up cooperation on external border controls.
The Laeken European Council decided to intensify cooperation in this field.
It requested the Council and the Commission to make proposals for a common
mechanism or service on external border controls.
A uniform format for residence permits to be issued to aliens who are not EU
nationals is also being developed at European level. The EU is also giving a
great deal of attention to local consular cooperation, including on issuing
visas and combating fraud.
Nationally, the Netherlands has taken the following measures:
Development of biometric identification techniques. In order to keep track
of aliens residing in the Netherlands, it is important to record certain
information about them before they enter the country. Information about
physical characteristics combined with records of personal details submitted
with visa applications and asylum applications and when entering and leaving
the country provides a powerful tool for identifying people. The individuals
in question can be identified and their details retrieved from information
systems more easily at a later stage, even if they have changed their
identity.
The EU has urged its member states to step up their controls of the external
borders. For the Netherlands, this means giving priority to the points of
entry: Schiphol airport and the ports (Rotterdam, Amsterdam).
Work is under way to improve information on human trafficking and possible
terrorist infiltration and activities. Capacity for analysing the
information is also being expanded.
At national level the BVD cooperates and exchanges information continuously
with the Royal Military Police on monitoring persons who might be involved
in or support terrorist activities and preventing them entering or leaving
the country. Some of this occurs as part of the Royal Military Police's
mobile immigration control unit (MTV).
3 (a) What steps have been taken to intensify and accelerate the exchange of
operational information in the areas indicated in this sub-paragraph?
The existing national and international cooperation in the fight against
terrorism, and its intensification since September 11 , are dealt with
under 2 (b).
At European level, operational cooperation was recently strengthened by the
establishment of consultations between the heads of counterterrorism of the
European security services. These talks will foster concrete measures to
improve operational cooperation.
Finally, the BVD has long worked closely and exchanged information with
national and international organisations and intelligence and security
services on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
In connection with the terrorist threat, the EU has launched a plan of
action to review and strengthen multilateral instruments in the area of
disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation. Export controls will be
strengthened to prevent terrorist groups acquiring materials related to
weapons of mass destruction.
Combating terrorism will be included as one of the objectives of the
Wassenaar Agreement. Terrorism will also be given more priority in
information exchanges.
3 (b) What steps have been taken to exchange information and cooperate in
the areas indicated in the areas of this sub-paragraph?
See 2 (b).
3 (c) What steps have been taken to cooperate in the areas indicated in this
sub-paragraph?
For measures in the European context, see the reply by the European Union.
The Kingdom of the Netherlands is also party to a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties in the areas indicated in this sub-paragraph. The most relevant treaties in this regard may be classified as follows:
- Conventions specifically related to the prevention and suppression of
international terrorism
(See also under 3 (d)) . In addition, the Netherlands has ratified the 1977
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (for the European part
of the Kingdom only)
- Extradition treaties
The Netherlands has concluded bilateral treaties with twenty other states
(some only for the European part of the Kingdom, others for the Netherlands
Antilles and Aruba as well). In addition, the Netherlands is party to the
1957 European Convention on Extradition, the 1962 Treaty between the
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg on extradition and assistance in
criminal matters, and the 1996 European Union Convention relating to
extradition between the member states of the European Union (not yet in
force).
- Treaties on mutual assistance in criminal matters.
The Netherlands has concluded bilateral treaties with seven other states
(some only for the European part of the Kingdom, others for the Netherlands
Antilles and Aruba as well). In addition, the Netherlands is party to the
1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and to the
1978 Additional Protocol to this convention (both for the European part of
the Kingdom and for the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba). A second additional
protocol to this convention was concluded in November 2001 but has not yet
entered into force. The Netherlands is also party to the 1962 Benelux
Convention on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and to
the 1974 Additional Protocol to this convention (only for the European part
of the Kingdom). Finally, two European Union conventions have been concluded
but have not yet entered into force: the 2000 Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters and the October 2001 Protocol to this
convention.
3 (d) What are your government's intentions regarding signing and/or
ratifying the conventions and protocols referred to in this sub-paragraph?
The Kingdom of the Netherlands has signed all twelve international
conventions relating to the prevention and suppression of international
terrorism and ratified ten of them. The procedure for parliamentary approval
of the two remaining conventions (Suppression of Terrorist Bombings;
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999) is almost complete. It is
expected that the Netherlands will ratify these two conventions in January
2002.
Three of the international conventions (1. on offences committed on board
aircraft, 2. on unlawful seizure of aircraft, 3. on acts against the safety
of aircraft) have already been fully implemented by the Netherlands Antilles
and Aruba as well. Implementation legislation is in preparation for the
remaining conventions in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, with the
assistance of the Netherlands where necessary.
The implementation legislation required for all twelve international
conventions will be finalised for all three parts of the Kingdom in 2002.
3 (e) Provide any relevant information on the implementation of the conventions, protocols and resolutions referred to in this sub-paragraph.
See under 3 (d).
3 (f) and 3 (g) What legislation, procedures and mechanisms are in place for
ensuring asylum seekers have been not been involved in terrorist activity
before granting refugee status. Please supply examples of any relevant
cases. What procedures are in place to prevent the abuse of refugee status
by terrorists? Please provide legislation and/or administrative procedures
which prevent claims of political motivation being recognised as grounds for
refusing the extradition of alleged terrorists. Please supply examples of
any relevant cases.
For measures taken in the EU context, see the reply by the EU.
Article 1F of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees already
allows the Netherlands to reject asylum applications of individuals in
respect of whom (under a) there are compelling reasons to suspect they have
committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity or
(under b) a serious nonpolitical crime outside the country of refuge. This
has occurred on several occasions.
The Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) will submit all asylum
applications to 1F screening. The Ministry of Justice has announced its
intention to set up a second 1F unit to ensure the careful and rapid
processing of article 1F cases. It should be operational by mid-2003.
Asylum seekers who have exhausted all legal remedies and who have been rejected under article 1F may in principle be deported to their country of origin. However, this may be prohibited under certain provisions in the ECHR (e.g. article 3) or provisions from other conventions (such as CAT). Asylum seekers who have exhausted all remedies and who do not comply with an order to leave the country have no right to services and facilities, which are therefore withdrawn. This discourages them from remaining in the Netherlands. If necessary, they can be declared undesirable aliens. The IND will probably make more use of this option in the future.
Under the Dutch Aliens Act, it is possible to withdraw refugee status once
granted. If, for example, a person with refugee status is recognised by his
or her victim, and this fact is brought to the attention of the IND then, if
the IND concludes that there is serious reason to suspect that the refugee
in question is guilty of a crime as listed in 1F, refugee status can be
withdrawn (irrespective of whether the refugee holds a permanent or
temporary residence permit; see art. 32 3n 35 of the 2000 Aliens Act). This
has occurred in practice.
The BVD and IND collaborate closely to exchange information on individuals
suspected of abusing the Dutch asylum and immigration system or not eligible
for refugee status (known as 1F status). Exchange of information on people
suspected of having committed or preparing terrorist activities has enjoyed
particular priority since September 11 . In such cases the head of the
BVD submits his findings to the State Secretary for Justice. The
investigation of illegal migration, the modus operandi of organisations
involved in this (including terrorist organisations) and support networks
for this kind of activity in the Netherlands has been stepped up over the
last few years.
As regards border controls and the issuing of visas, the general measures
described under 2 (g) have been taken at European level.
3.3. States may include in their reports additional relevant information, including information on the issues covered by paragraph 4 of resolutions 1373 (2001). They may also include general observations on the implementation of the resolution, and outline any problems encountered.
The following are annexed to this report:
the action plan containing 45 new measures against terrorism;
the memorandum detailing measures to further strengthen the integrity of the financial sector and prevent terrorist activities.
Kenmerk
Blad /1
The Kingdom of the Netherlands comprises the three autonomous
countries the Netherlands (Europe) and the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.
Additional penalties will be possible, including:
· closing down a business
· disenfranchisement
· publication of judgment.
Other additional measures can include:
· Taking over control of the offender's business where the offence was
committed, in the case of intent, for a maximum of 3 years and, where there
was no intent, for a maximum of 2 years.
· Imposing an obligation to do what has illegally been neglected, to annul
what has been illegally done, and to perform what has to be done to make
reparations, all at the offender's expense, in so far as the court does not
decide otherwise.
See Taliban of Afghanistan Sanctions Order II (Sanctieregeling Taliban
van Afghanistan II), October 8, 2001, published in the Government Gazette
(Staatscourant) of 10 October 2001.
See Amendment to Taliban of Afghanistan Sanctions Order II (Wijziging
Sanctieregeling Taliban van Afghanistan II), 12 October 2001, published in
the Government Gazette (Staatscourant) of 15 October 2001
See Taliban of Afghanistan Sanctions Order III (Sanctieregeling Taliban
van Afghanistan III), 8 November 2001, published in the Government Gazette
(Staatscourant) of 8 November 2001
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